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Congress’s Commissioners:
Former Hill Staffers at the S.E.C. and Other
Independent Regulatory Commissions
Brian D. Feinstein† & M. Todd Henderson††

The expression “personnel is policy” has become a truism in Washington. Yet our understanding of how the political branches use appointments to project influence into the administrative state is incomplete. This
Article leverages data on almost one-thousand commissioners serving on
eleven major independent regulatory commissions to chart, for the first
time, Congress’s growing practice of placing former legislative-branch personnel onto these entities. We then theorize that this phenomenon is
rooted in fundamental changes in American politics in recent decades—
and, in turn, that it has deeply affected administrative law and separationof-powers dynamics.
Over the past several decades, the number of commissioners with
prior service as a lawmaker or congressional staffer increased almost fourfold. Paradoxically, this sea change occurred during a period in which, according to conventional wisdom, Congress’s influence over administration
declined. We contend that, faced with a set of worsening pathologies in
Congress, lawmakers turned to appointments to influence policymaking.
At the same time, congressional atrophy and an increasingly rocky confirmation process combined to make executive posts more attractive to Hill
staffers than to others.
This influx of staffers-turned-commissioners has, we argue, substantially altered the functioning of these commissions and their place in the
separation-of-powers system. Congress’s ability to “embed” loyal former
staffers on commissions can benefit both institutions. From their new positions, former staffers can both enhance congressional influence over administration and provide commissions with valuable insights into the views
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and priorities of the branch that writes their statutes, sets their budgets,
and oversees their activities.
Staffers-turned-commissioners also bring with them political savvy,
familiarity with the legislative process, and other skills developed on Capitol Hill. Further, as former staffers—steeped in the norms of an increasingly dysfunctional Congress—fill more seats on commissions, these bodies may undergo a degree of acculturation, encouraging more overtly political behavior among commissioners.
Our descriptive and theoretical accounts generate two prescriptions.
First, in evaluating potential appointees, presidents and senators should be
attuned not only to those individuals’ preferences and expertise, but also
to their institutional allegiances and potential impact on organizational
culture. Second, increased congressional influence over independent commissions justifies a degree of presidential oversight. If commissioners are
political actors—grounded in the politics of their congressional principal
and carriers of Congress’s culture—they should be subject to controls from
both political branches.
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Congress’s Commissioners
Introduction
Richard Roberts wasn’t your typical Securities and Exchange Commissioner. At the time of his appointment in 1990, he was not known to the
Washington securities bar.1 He arrived at the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) by way of the Washington office of a Mobile, Alabama-based law firm.2 The key fact on his resume was his prior service as
chief of staff to Senator Richard Shelby, then a first-term senator from Alabama and member of the Senate Banking Committee and, before that, a
backbencher in the House.3 The President nominated Roberts to the SEC
at Senator Shelby’s urging.4 As Roberts acknowledges, he was “a longshot.”5
Roberts’s status as a congressional staffer-turned-commissioner was
novel in 1990. Prior to his appointment, only 10 of the 112 then-current and
former SEC commissioners had Hill experience.6 Today, however, Roberts’s résumé is typical; roughly half of the current members of the most
consequential independent boards and commissions hail from the halls of
Congress.7 Since 1980, the number of former staffers serving on independent commissions has increased more than fourfold; it has nearly tripled in
the last twenty years alone.8 That rapid increase is remarkable—and it may
not just impact the functioning of these bodies but also suggest changes in
our underlying politics that implicate broader policy issues.
But the story of Commissioner Roberts gives us another reason to be
interested in the rise of the staffer-to-commissioner pipeline. Roberts did
not just owe his job on the SEC to Senator Shelby; he tracked his patron’s

1.
See Gregory A. Robb, Democrat for S.E .C. Seat, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 1990),
https://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/04/business/democrat-for-sec-seat.html
[https://perma.cc/6BPX-TNGS].
2.
Id.
3.
See id.; see also Jeanne Meserve, CNN Access: Former Democrat Explains His Party
Switch, CNN (May 24, 2001, 6:32 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/05/24/shelby.switch.cnna/index.html [https://perma.cc/F5XJ-DK87] (quoting Senator
Shelby, “I was not a committee chairman. I had not flourished in the [Democratic] party [prior to
1994] . . . I had no position of power.”).
4.
See Stephen Labaton, Wall Street’s Ambitious Top Cop, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 1991),
https://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/24/magazine/wall-street-s-ambitious-top-cop.html
[https://perma.cc/CKM7-ASKT].
5.
Interview by William Thomas with Richard Roberts, Former SEC Comm’r, in Washington, D.C., SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION HIST. SOC’Y 11 (May 15, 2014),
http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/oral-histories/20140515_Roberts_Richard_T.pdf [https://perma.cc/JF57-KDLL].
6.
See infra Section I.B (describing data sources for this figure).
7.
See infra Section I.B.
8.
See infra Figure 1.
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politics. Appointed to fill a Democratic seat on the Commission, Roberts—like Senator Shelby at the time—was a Democrat.9 Then, the day
after the 1994 election, Senator Shelby announced that he was joining the
Republican Party.10 Shortly thereafter, Roberts announced that he too was
switching teams11—making him the first and, to this day, only Commissioner to do so.12 There was no strategic reason for Roberts to make this
switch.13 Instead, Roberts considered it as an expression of loyalty to Senator Shelby. “When Senator Shelby changed parties, I changed,” he explained.14 “At heart, I’d worked for Senator Shelby for most of my life and
so I just felt like that was the place for me to be.”15 If today’s staffersturned-commissioners display a similar degree of loyalty to their political
patrons on Capitol Hill, then this development may pull these independent
agencies towards Congress.
Another development makes the picture we are starting to paint even
more interesting. Over the past few decades, both chambers of Congress
have become increasingly polarized, adversarial, and dysfunctional.16 This
Article advances the idea that these dual phenomena—growing partisan
dysfunction in Congress and more Hill alumni running independent agencies—may be linked. With Congress’s lawmaking function diminished, senators turn to the appointment of like-minded, loyal staffers, like Roberts,
as an alternative means of influencing policy. At the same time, Congress’s
pathologies have altered the pool of potential appointees, making a position off the Hill more attractive for congressional staffers and less attractive for those employed outside of politics or the Beltway.

9.
Robb, supra note 1.
10.
See Senators Who Changed Parties During Senate Service (Since 1890), U.S. SENATE
https://www.senate.gov/senators/SenatorsWhoChangedPartiesDuringSenateService.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZTZ6-DV2F].
11.
Thomas, supra note 5, at 30.
12.
See SEC Historical Summary of Chairmen and Commissioners, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm
[https://perma.cc/7TPP-LHY2].
13.
Because there was already one vacant seat and Roberts’s term would expire in nine
months, his switch did not force President Clinton to appoint an additional Democrat to the Commission to adhere to the Commission’s partisan balance requirement. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a)
(2018) (“Not more than three [of five] . . . commissioners shall be members of the same political
party.”). Neither did his switch appear to be opportunistic; he did not work in politics or government again after his term ended nine months later. See Richard Y. Roberts: Biography, R OBERTS
RAHEB
&
GRADLER
LLC,
https://www.rrg-llc.com/images/RickLongBio.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UK3H-WNBS].
14.
Thomas, supra note 5.
15.
Id.
16.
See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273, 276-81 (2011); see also id. at 323-24 (summarizing research showing that these pathologies are almost as severe in the Senate as in the House).
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The increasing partisanship of Capitol Hill may not just make congressional staffers more attractive appointees, but may also alter the functioning of the agencies they now help run. Staffers-turned-commissioners
likely bring to agencies the very pathologies of the Hill that made them
leave in the first place. For instance, whereas the SEC was once seen
mostly as a model of nonpartisan efficiency, contemporary observers, including recent chairs Arthur Levitt and Mary Schapiro, view it as divided
by faction and increasingly dysfunctional.17 These developments may be
traceable in part to the rise of staffers-turned-commissioners transmitting
Congress’s partisan culture to independent agencies.
The staffers-turned-commissioners phenomenon also may yield several important benefits to both Congress and the affected commissions.
Congress may profit from the presence of its former staffers on independent commissions, since they can transmit information to Congress at lower
cost. Relatedly, staffers-turned-commissioners may leverage their preexisting relationships with legislators to their agencies’ benefit—in essence,
engaging in relationship-based lobbying. To the extent that staffersturned-commissioners were exposed to mass politics from their time on
Capitol Hill, their presence may inject a measure of democratic responsiveness into agency decision making. Finally, staffers-turned-commissioners may import to the agencies valuable skills learned on the Hill. For instance, their greater understanding of the lawmaking process and legislative intent may improve the rulemaking capacity of their agencies, and
their political instincts may enable their agencies to achieve their objectives in an increasingly partisan climate.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the legal landscape concerning experiential or credential requirements for appointees
and documents, for the first time, the growing prevalence of staffersturned-commissioners. Part II posits two causes of this trend: first, that
Congress, mindful of the maxim that personnel is policy, has turned to appointing its loyalists to agencies as its direct influence on policymaking has
waned; and second, that congressional dysfunction has skewed the pool of
potential appointees towards Hill staffers. Part III considers potential consequences of the rise of staffers-turned-commissioners. Part IV draws out
prescriptive implications of our findings.

17.
See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Chief Pursues Tougher Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES:
(Feb.
22,
2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/23/business/23schapiro.html
[https://perma.cc/HCT7-K8PG] (quoting former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt Jr.’s observation that
the SEC “since it was formed, was always known as nonpartisan and free of interference from the
White House,” but that “[i]n recent years that changed”); id. (characterizing incoming chair Mary
Schapiro as desiring to eliminate “partisan politics” from the SEC to restore its credibility”).
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I. Law and Practice

A. Legal Framework
There are few constitutional constraints on the identities or characteristics of individuals whom the President and Senate may appoint to principal offices.18 Among the few restrictions are that members of Congress
cannot serve in executive positions.19 Laws that entrust Congress or particular legislators with the power to name individuals to executive positions
are also unconstitutional.20 Statutory mechanisms that overly constrain the
President’s choice set—such as by requiring that the President select nominees from a list curated by Congress—are also impermissible.21
Within these broad parameters—and over the objections of some
presidents22 and scholars,23 courts grant Congress wide latitude to impose
character-and-credential requirements on appointees to certain offices.24
Congress has taken advantage of the relative lack of judicial constraints in
this area, inserting experiential requirements in many agencies’ organic

18.
By contrast, the Supreme Court takes a more active role in other aspects of the law
of appointments. See, e.g., Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018) (elucidating the line between
“Officers of the United States,” who must be installed pursuant to the Appointments Clause, and
employees); Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (determining when
recess appointments are permitted); Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659-660 (1997) (expounding on the distinction between principal officers, whom only the President may appoint,
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and inferior officers).
19.
See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise,
501 U.S. 252, 274 (1991).
20.
See id.; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126-40 (1976); Springer v. Gov’t of Philippine
Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928).
21.
See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986); Hechinger v. Metro. Wash. Airports
Auth., 36 F.3d 97, 100-01, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
22.
See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1742, 1742-43 (Oct. 4, 2006) (asserting that the
Act “purports to limit the qualifications of the pool of persons from whom the President may
select the [FEMA Administrator] in a manner that rules out a large portion of those persons best
qualified,” and, thus, “[t]he executive branch shall construe [it] in a manner consistent with the
Appointments Clause”); Statement on Signing the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1907, 1907 (Dec. 19, 1995) (“Congress may not . . . impose broad restrictions on the President’s constitutional prerogative to nominate persons of his choosing to the highest executive
branch positions.”).
23.
See Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive Understanding of the Federal
Appointments Process, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 467, 534-35 (1998); Donald J. Kochan,

The Unconstitutionality of Class-Based Statutory Limitations on Presidential Nominations: Can
a Man Head the Women’s Bureau at the Department of Labor?, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43, 46 (2005);
Hannah Metchis Volokh, The Two Appointments Clauses: Statutory Qualifications for Federal
Officers, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745 (2008).
24.
See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 128-31 (1926) (noting, in dictum, that statutory qualifications requirements are permitted, provided that they “do not so limit selection and
so trench upon executive choice as to be in effect legislative designation”); id. at 264-65 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (similar point); Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821,
825 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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statutes. These requirements fall into two conceptually distinct categories:
mandates that appointees possess expertise in the relevant subject matter—with professional credentials usually serving as a proxy for expertise—and requirements aimed at promoting certain perspectives among
appointees.
Expertise-promoting requirements are the more familiar category.
They date to the Judiciary Act of 1789, passed by the First Congress, which
required the Attorney General and U.S. attorneys to be “learned in the
law.”25 Congress imposed similar requirements for professional qualifications or experiences across executive branch offices throughout the nineteenth century.26
During the Progressive and New Deal eras, these requirements proliferated within the executive branch. A central tenet of public administration theory during this period was scientific management, the notion that
the administrative state could and should be managed by neutral technocrats divorced from politics.27 To that end, reformers added credential requirements to offices across the administrative state.28 Moreover, fixed
terms for independent regulatory commissioners were justified as enabling
appointees to gain expertise through experience on the commission.29
Today, expertise requirements are present throughout administration. Members of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board must be “respected experts in . . . nuclear safety with a demonstrated competence and
knowledge relevant to [the Board’s work].”30 At least one member of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation must have previously served as a
state banking supervisor.31 The Director of the Federal Housing Finance
Agency must “have a demonstrated understanding of financial management or oversight, and . . . of capital markets, including the mortgage securities markets and housing finance.”32 Similar requirements concerning
“professional standing and demonstrated knowledge in the field[]” requirements exist for positions within the Surface Transportation Board,33

25.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93 (1789). Today, the Solicitor General
is subject to a similar requirement. See 28 U.S.C. § 505 (2018).
26.
See Myers, 272 U.S. at 265-74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (collecting statutes).
27.
See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and
Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 A DMIN. L. R EV. 1111, 1133-34 (2000).
28.
See id.
29.
See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624-25 (1935); see also Rachel
E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX . L. REV.
15, 29 (2010).
30.
42 U.S.C. § 2286(b)(1) (2018).
31.
12 U.S.C. § 1812(a)(1)(C) (2018).
32.
12 U.S.C. § 4512(b)(1) (2018).
33.
49 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(2)(A) (2018).
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Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),34 Postal Regulatory
Commission,35 Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,36 and
Office of Special Counsel,37 among other offices.38
The second category of requirements promotes the representation of
specific perspectives on administrative bodies. Most notably, twenty-three
multimember commissions require partisan balance among their members; in most cases, only a bare majority may hail from the same political
party.39 Partisan-balance requirements have yielded real ideological diversity on commissions, with Republican presidents generally appointing
bona fide liberals for Democratic seats, and Democratic presidents appointing true conservatives to Republican seats.40 Accordingly, these requirements ensure that certain political views are represented on commission daises regardless of the party controlling the White House.41
Other membership requirements promote viewpoint representation
in more subtle ways. The composition of the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors (the Fed) must include “fair representation of . . . financial, agriculture, industrial, and commercial interests . . . .”42 At least two out of

34.
See 6 U.S.C. § 313(c)(2)(A) (2018). Following Hurricane Katrina, Congress added a
requirement that FEMA’s administrator possess at least five years of “executive leadership and
management experience.” Id. § 313(c)(2)(B), as added by Pub. L. No. 109-295, Title VI, § 611(11),
120 Stat. 1355, 1397 (2006); see also LOUIS FISHER, THE LAW OF THE E XECUTIVE BRANCH: PRESIDENTIAL POWER 132 (2014) (noting that Congress amended the statute in response to FEMA’s
emergency-response performance following that disaster).
35.
See 39 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2018).
36.
See 29 U.S.C. § 661(a) (2018).
37.
See 5 U.S.C. § 1211(b) (2018).
38.
Oddly, some statutes merely require that the President “consider” appointing individuals with relevant experiences or credentials. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1752a(b)(2)(A) (2018)
(providing that, in selecting National Credit Union Administration board members, “the President shall give consideration to individuals who, by virtue of their education, training, or experience relating to a broad range of financial services . . . are especially qualified to serve on the
Board”); 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) (2018) (requiring the President to “consider” for the Consumer
Product Safety Commission individuals with “background and expertise in areas related to consumer products and protection of the public from risks to safety”).
39.
See Brian D. Feinstein & Daniel J. Hemel, Partisan Balance with Bite, 118 COLUM.
L. REV. 9, 31, 41 (2018) (identifying the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Federal Communications Commission, and twenty-one other boards and commissions with partisan-balance
requirements).
40.
See id. at 14.
41.
See Daniel E. Ho, Congressional Agency Control: The Impact of Statutory Partisan
Requirements on Regulation 1-3 (Feb. 12, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), https://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2219&context=alea
[https://perma.cc/4V3J-NPGA]
(“[T]he effect of [FCC] [C]ommissioner ideology on voting is profound. Commissioner partisan
affiliation exhibits robust and large predictive power over votes, even holding constant the party
of the appointing president.”).
42.
12 U.S.C. § 241 (2018). The Board also must be geographically balanced and include
least one member with “demonstrated primary experience working in or supervising [small] community banks . . . .” Id.
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the five members of the Surface Transportation Board must possess private-sector experience.43 By contrast, Congress actively discourages private-sector views on the National Credit Union Administration, where
“[n]ot more than one” out of the three board members may hail from a
credit union.44
At first glance, these industry-representation requirements may appear as merely another way to ensure that various forms of expertise are
present on commissions. But they go beyond that purpose. For instance,
an individual can possess expertise concerning the financial sector without
being a “representat[ive] of . . . financial . . . interests,”45 as the Fed’s statute
requires. By mandating appointments from industry—rather than from the
broader category of experts concerning that industry, such as academics
and civil servants, these provisions ensure that certain industry or interestgroup perspectives are included on commissions. Accordingly, the drafters
of these provisions presumably understood that a commissioner’s employment history can influence her current policy outlook.46
Some representational requirements are even more specific. The Secretary of Defense cannot have served in the military during the preceding
seven years;47 the Federal Reserve Board48 and the central bank’s Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) both must be geographically balanced;49 two seats on the three-person National Indian Gaming Commission are reserved for enrolled members of a Native American tribe;50 and
the Director of the Women’s Bureau of the Department of Labor must be
a woman.51

43.
See 49 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(2)(B) (2018).
44.
12 U.S.C. § 1752a(b)(2)(B) (2018).
45.
Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2018).
46.
Cf. Rufus E. Miles, Jr., The Origin and Meaning of Miles’ Law, 38 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
399 (1978) (discussing the origins of the aphorism “[w]here you stand depends on where you sit”).
47.
See 10 U.S.C. § 113(a) (“A person may not be appointed as Secretary of Defense
within seven years after relief from active duty as a commissioned officer of a regular component
of an armed force.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2286(b)(1) (requiring that Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board members be “from civilian life”). The Senate has waived the civilian Defense Secretary requirement in the recent past, see, e.g., Act of Jan. 20, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-2, 131 Stat. 6
(waiving the provision as applied to General James Mattis), and could waive requirements concerning other offices as well. Alternatively, perhaps the Senate could simply ignore these requirements if it so chose, because judicial challenges to confirmation decisions arguably are nonjusticiable.
48.
See 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2018) (mandating that no more than one Board member be
appointed from any one Federal Reserve District and that the President consider “fair representation of . . . geographical divisions of the country”).
49.
See 12 U.S.C. § 263(a) (2018) (providing that the directors of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York select one of the twelve members of the FOMC, and the directors of the other
eleven regional Reserve Banks select four additional FOMC members).
50.
25 U.S.C. § 2704 (2018).
51.
See 29 U.S.C. § 12 (2018).
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By imposing these unambiguous representational requirements, Congress acknowledges the importance of identity and past experiences in
shaping one’s perspective. There are without a doubt many talented and
knowledgeable candidates who could fill these roles but do not meet the
above requirements. By imposing these restrictions, Congress is signaling
that there is something about having certain experiences or traits—as a civilian in a defense position, as a central banker outside of the Acela corridor, as a Native American, or as a woman—that provides an individual
with a different expected perspective, from a similarly credentialed person
without that experience or trait.
So too, we contend, does Congress have a similar perspective on the
experience of serving as a congressional staffer.52 In Part II, we argue that
Congress has shown an increasing propensity to place its former staffers
on independent regulatory commissions, based in part on legislators’ belief
that these staffers’ service to Congress, and ties that they maintain with
their former colleagues on the Hill, will engender loyalty to that institution.
In Part III, we describe how staffers-turned-commissioners’ acculturation
in Congress has in fact changed the working culture of their agencies. But
first, we detail the growing prominence of former congressional staffers on
independent regulatory commissions.

B. The Congress-to-Commission Phenomenon
Today, the presence of former congressional staffers on the daises of
multimember commissions and boards is common. Two out of the five current commissioners of the SEC are former senior staffers on the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Senate Banking
Committee).53 Two of the four current members of the National Labor Re-

52.
Could Congress pass a law requiring, for example, that the President fill certain seats
“from among former legislators or legislative staff”? Almost certainly—provided that Congress
did not attempt to fill the seats with current lawmakers. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252, 267 (1991) (invalidating this practice on
separation-of-powers grounds). The illustrative language tracks other existing experiential requirements. See 12 U.S.C. § 635a(c)(8)(B) (2018) (requiring that at least one board member of
the Export-Import Bank “be selected from among the small business community and . . . represent
the interests of small business”). But, considering that former staffers are appointed to these positions in growing numbers without such statutory requirements, why call attention to the practice
by enshrining it in statute?
53.
Hester Peirce served as senior counsel to the Senate Banking Committee under
Chairman Richard Shelby (R-AL). Commissioner Hester M. Pierce, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/biography/commissioner-hester-m-peirce
[https://perma.cc/XF72-P7Q6]. Kara Stein served as senior policy advisor for securities and banking policy to Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) and staff director of the Securities, Insurance and Investment Subcommittee of the Senate Banking Committee. Commissioner Kara M. Stein, U.S. SEC.
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lations Board (NLRB) are former senior congressional staffers with experience on labor committees.54 As Table 1 shows, Capitol Hill alumni are
well-represented on most of the other major independent boards and commissions. (For simplicity, we adopt the term “commission” to refer to any
multimember agency and “commissioner” to refer to any member of one
of these agencies.)
Table 1: Composition of Independent Regulatory Commissions55
Agency

Members with
Hill Experience
2

Total Current
Members
4

Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n (EEOC)

2

3

Federal Communications Commission (FCC)

3

4

Federal Election Commission
(FEC)

2

4

Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC)

3

5

Federal Reserve Board of Governors (Fed)

0

3

Federal Trade Commission
(FTC)

2

5

Consumer Products Safety
Commission (CPSC)

&
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION ,
https://www.sec.gov/biography/stein-kara-m
[https://perma.cc/Y7KW-8C2Z].
54.
Lauren McFerran served as chief labor counsel and deputy staff director of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP), and senior labor counsel to
Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) and Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA). Lauren McFerran, NAT’L
LAB. REL. B OARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/bio/lauren-mcferran [https://perma.cc/2YL9-G75V].
Marvin Kaplan served as counsel to the House Committee on Oversight and Reform and as policy
counsel to the House Committee on Education and Labor. Marvin E. Kaplan, NAT’L LAB. REL.
BOARD,
https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/marvin-e-kaplan
[https://perma.cc/LQY925Q9].
55.
Data obtained via agency websites and other online biographies, and is current as of
July 31, 2020.
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National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB)

2

4

National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB)

0

3

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

3

5

Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC)

2

5

TOTAL

21

44

Among the multimember independent agencies included in Table 1,
twenty-one out of forty-four commissioners and board members (fortyeight percent) had previous experience working for Congress. Typically,
this experience involved a senior policy role on a House or Senate committee with authorization and oversight jurisdiction over the relevant
agency.
How does the present level of representation of former Hill staffers
on commissions compare to historical practice? To answer this question,
we leverage data on the biographies of commissioners and board members
on the eleven major commissions and boards included in Table 1.
We start with Professor David Nixon’s Independent Regulatory
Commission Database. Nixon identifies every former member of Congress
or congressional staffer who later served on one of the eleven commissions
listed in Table 1 through 2000.56 The Federal Trade Commission and Federal Reserve Board were the first of these eleven commissions to be established, both in 1914.57 Accordingly, our analysis begins in that year. We

David C. Nixon, Independent Regulatory Commissioner Database, 1887-2000, INCONSORTIUM FOR POL . & SOC. RES. (Sept.
25,
2007),
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/4221
[https://perma.cc/EB4G-NLWW].
Specifically, Nixon codes for whether each commissioner served as a congressional staffer or held
a “federal elective office” in one of the individual’s four previous positions. See David C. Nixon,
Codebook for Independent Regulatory Commissioner Data Base, INDEPENDENT REGULATORY
COMMISSIONER DATA BASE 7 (Mar. 10, 2005), http://www2.hawaii.edu/~dnixon/IRC/irc_codebook_110.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5FV-FJD3]. In practice, the only former federal elected officials
to later serve as commissioners are former members of Congress.
57.
See Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 52 Stat. 111; Federal
Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251. The Banking Act of 1935 altered the entity’s
56.

TER-UNIVERSITY
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then scoured agency and professional websites, LinkedIn profiles, and
other online sources to extend Nixon’s classifications from 2001 to 2018. In
all, we obtained data on 977 commissioners serving on these eleven commissions.58
Figure 1 displays the results of this effort: the first look at the growth
of the Congress-to-commission pipeline. Each dot indicates the proportion
of commissioners with Hill experience that were appointed in a given
year.59 The figure displays a loess curve in blue, along with associated
ninety-five percent confidence intervals in gray.60 Figure 1 reveals an overall slight decrease in the proportion of new commissioners with Hill experience from the New Deal era to the 1980s, followed by an increase that
accelerates into the 2000s.

governance structure and functions and changed its name to the “Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.” See Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, § 203, 49 Stat. 684, 704-05.
For purposes of this analysis, we consider the latter entity to be a continuation of the former.
58.
The included members and years for each of the eleven commissions are: CPSC
(thirty-nine members, 1972-2018); EEOC (fifty-seven members, 1965-2018); FCC (123 members,
1934-2018); FEC (fifty members, 1975-2018); Federal Reserve (119 members, 1914-2018); FERC
(fifty-six members, 1977-2018); FTC (114 members, 1914-2018); NLRB (110 members 1935-2018);
NRC (108 members, 1974-2018); NTSB (sixty members, 1967-2018); SEC (141 members, 19352018).
59.
By focusing exclusively on new appointees, Figure 1 eliminates a key source of autocorrelation present in the loess curve in Figure 2, which shows the proportion of commissioners
with Hill experience serving in a given year. Consider the career of Michael O’Rielly, a longtime
advisor to several members of Congress and congressional committees who began serving as an
FCC Commissioner in 2013. See Michael O’Rielly, FED. COMM. COMMISSION ,
https://www.fcc.gov/about/leadership/mike-orielly#bio [https://perma.cc/A9KN-U89T]. Commissioners serve fixed terms and rarely resign in their second year, so O’Rielly’s presence in our dataset in 2013 essentially perfectly predicts his presence in 2014. More generally, his presence or
absence in any given year in our dataset is highly correlated with his presence or absence in the
previous year. Thus, the observations in our dataset are not independent. Instead, whether the
individual holding commission seat c at time t has prior Hill experience is serially correlated with
whether the individual holding seat c at t-1 has prior Hill experience.
After eliminating an important source of non-independence among commissioner-year observations, the loess curve in Figure 1 exhibits markedly less autocorrelation than that in Figure 2; the
value of the function for a one-year lag in Figure 2 is 0.882 versus 0.125 in Figure 1.
60.
A loess curve is a locally weighted, non-parametric regression line; essentially, a trend
line.
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Figure 1: Proportion of New Commissioners with Hill Experience

Given the significant year-to-year variation in the proportion of newly
appointed commissioners with Hill experience, Figure 1 is somewhat
lumpy.
Figure 2 provides another perspective on these data. Whereas Figure
1 illustrates the proportion of commissioners with Hill experience appointed in a given year, Figure 2 shows the proportion of currently serving
commissioners with Hill experience in each year.
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Figure 2: Proportion of Commissioners with Hill Experience

As the figure shows, this proportion remained relatively steady
throughout most of the twentieth century, exhibiting a slight, gradual
decline from around 1940 to 1980. Although the figure fluctuated considerably during the 1980s through the early 2000s, the general trend
was positive. Around 2005, however, the proportion of commissioners
with Hill experience changed dramatically. In that year, the figure
jumped from 17%—around where it had hovered for the previous decade—to 31%. By 2009, the figure reached its global maximum: 53%.
For the next ten years, the figure fluctuated between 33% and 45%.
Figures 1 and 2 reveal a clear time trend in the proportion of commissioners with previous Hill experience: an overall slight decrease in
this proportion from the New Deal era to the 1980s, followed by an
increase that accelerates into the 2000s. Both figures illustrate that
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there has been a marked and sustained influx from Capitol Hill onto
multimember independent agencies in the past fifteen years or so.61
Still, there are two plausible alternative explanations to a time
trend. First, a handful of outlier agencies could be driving these results,
with most agencies not exhibiting this trend. Second, divided government—which has become a more frequent occurrence in recent decades62—could explain the phenomenon. When different parties control
the Senate and White House, Senate leadership lacks partisan or electoral incentives to acquiesce to presidential demands and instead
adopts a more assertive posture.63 If Senate leadership has always favored appointing legislative branch staffers to executive agencies, and
Senate leadership is more assertive during divided government,64 then
we would expect to see a higher proportion of Hill staffers appointed
to executive agencies during periods of divided government. That divided government has become more common over time raises the possibility that what we interpret as a time trend in the proportion of commissioners with previous Hill experience may instead be reflecting an
omitted variable: the presence of divided government.65
To examine the relative roles that (1) a time trend, (2) outlier
agencies, and (3) the presence or absence of divided government play
in the growth of the Hill-to-agency pipeline, we regress whether a given
commissioner has Hill experience on (1) the year in which the individual was appointed; (2) the agency to which he or she was appointed;
and (3) whether different parties controlled the presidency and Senate
at the time of appointment.
Because there is no clear-cut way to model the nonlinear trend line
in Figures 1 and 2, we take three approaches. Model 1 estimates a linear
61.
This trend is consistent with Professor Daniel Ho’s observation that, whereas no FCC
commissioners had previous experience as congressional staffers between 1965 and 1979, fourteen
percent of FCC commissioners had such experience between 1980 and 2006. See Ho, supra note
41, at 29.
Examining individual figures for each of the eleven included agencies shows that the general trend
observed in Figures 1 and 2 is clearly present for the CPSC, EEOC, FCC, Fed, NTSB, NRC, and
SEC. The trend is also present for the FEC, FTC, and NLRB in recent decades only, with the
proportion of commissioners with Hill experience increasing at the FEC and FTC since the mid1990s and at the NRLB since the early 1970s. The trend is not present for the NLRB.
62.
The Pearson correlation coefficient for the Year and Divided Government variables
introduced infra, Table 2, is 0.190.
63.
See DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL
CONTROL AND B UREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 60-66 (2008) (reporting that the proportion of
new agencies with limitations on appointments is higher under divided government); DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING P OWERS: A TRANSACTION COST P OLITICS APPROACH TO P OLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 77-78 (1999) (finding that Congress
places greater constraints on executive agencies’ discretion under divided government).
64.
See supra note 63.
65.
See supra note 62 (reporting the correlation between divided government and time).
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regression model for appointments between 1980 and 2018. This section of the loess curve in Figure 1 approximates a linear function, making linear regression more appropriate. Models 2 and 3, by contrast, use
nonparametric forms to model the entire 1914-2018 period. Model 2
transforms the Year variable into a cubic polynomial (Year, Year2,
Year3); this transformation provides the closest approximation to the
nonparametric plot in Figure 1.66 Finally, Model 3 employs a spline regression model, in which each segment of a polynomial function is estimated separately.67 Internal breakpoints at the years 1930 and 1972—
the approximate internal local maximum and local minimum, respectively, of the curve in Figure 1—establish the three segments of the
spline.
Finally, Model 4, which is unreported, presents an alternative
spline regression model with an additional breakpoint at 2004. Because
Figure 2 exhibits a substantial discontinuity around 2004, this model
tests whether the post-2004 period completely drives any observed time
trend. 68
These models also include a Divided Govt covariate, which denotes whether different political parties controlled the Senate and presidency in a given year, as well as agency fixed effects. Table 2 reports
the results.

66.
Per convention, this function also includes linear and quadratic terms (i.e. Year and
Year2, as well as Year3). As a check, we computed Akaike information criterion (AIC) and adjusted R-squared values for first-, second-, third-, and fourth-degree polynomial transformations
of Year. We found that the third-degree polynomial produced the largest R-squared value and
was trivially larger than the lowest AIC value. Accordingly, using the third-degree polynomial is
most appropriate. See John H. McDonald, Handbook of Biological Statistics, SPARKY HOUSE
PUB.
217
(2014),
http://www.biostathandbook.com/HandbookBioStatThird.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TVX5-X58H].
67.
See Jeffrey S. Racine, A Primer on Regression Splines, COMPREHENSIVE R ARCHIVE
N ETWORK ,
https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/crs/vignettes/spline_primer.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GZK2-Y7XW].
68.
This fourth model reports positive, substantially large, and statistically significant coefficient estimates for both the 1973-2004 and 2005-2018 periods, which indicates that the discontinuity around 2004 observed in Figure 2 is not driving the results.
To further assess whether any system-wide feature caused the jump around 2004 in Figure 2, we
produced separate versions of that figure for each commission. As the figures show, all commissions except one exhibit a general increase in the proportion of staffers-turned-commissioners in
the last several decades. Given the small number of observations for individual commissions, we
do not make much of these single-commission results. But, at the very least, they do not suggest
that any system-wide phenomenon is present around 2004.
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Table 2: Staffers-Turned-Commissioners Over Time
Model 1
Year

Model 2

Model 3

0.065**
(0.012)

Year Cubed

0.0001*
(0.00005)

1914-1930

1.436
(0.904)

1931-1972

0.166
(0.827)

1973-2018

2.494**
(0.843)

Divided Govt

-0.433
(0.272)

-0.275
(0.218)

-0.352
(0.212)

Agency Fixed
Effects

Y

Y

Y

Unit of analysis: appointments and reappointments to eleven boards and
commissions. Dependent variable: whether the appointment is filled by an
individual who previously worked for or served in Congress. Model: logistic
regression (all models); Model 2 contains a third-degree polynomial transformation of Year (Year & Year2 terms included in model, but unreported
in table); Model 3 employs regression splines at 1914-1930, 1931-1972, and
1973-2018. Agency covariates modeled as fixed effects. Period: 1980-2018
(Model 1); 1914-2018 (Model 2); 1914-2018 (Model 3). Observations: 459
(Model 1); 977 (Model 2); 977 (Model 3). Pseudo-R2: 0.142 (Model 1); 0.118
(Model 2); 0.111 (Model 3). *** signifies p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, †
p < 0.10.

That the coefficient estimates for Divided Govt are negative and do
not reach conventionally accepted levels of statistical significance is not
consistent with an argument that more frequent divided government is
driving the trend of former Hill staffers serving as commissioners. We cannot, however, reject the null hypothesis that the presence of divided government has no bearing on the placement of Hill staffers on these agencies.
The potential lack of association between divided government and
the strength of the staffers-to-commissioners phenomenon bears on the
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debate over the extent to which lawmakers are loyal to Congress as their
home institution or to their political party, and thus less willing to engage
in Madisonian interbranch competition with a same-party President.69
That the staffers-to-commissioners trend increases year after year, during
periods of unified as well as divided government—and, we posit, in response to growing presidential power in other areas—suggests that legislators’ institutional loyalty to Congress can trump their partisan or ideological affiliations.
More notably for our purposes, the positive and mostly statistically
significant coefficient estimates for the time-related variables suggest the
presence of a time trend. Controlling for any agency-specific effects or the
presence of divided or unified government, the proportion of commissioners with prior Hill experience tends to increase over time.70
The use of a logit model precludes straightforward interpretation of
the magnitude of this trend. Accordingly, we transform several key coefficient estimates into predicted probabilities.71 The following figure charts

69.
Compare David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional
Law, 85 C HI. L. REV. 1, 5 (2018) (arguing that institutional loyalties persist and may still influence
the behavior of federal officials), with Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. R EV. 2311, 2329 (2006) (contending that party loyalty drives interbranch dynamics and concluding that interbranch competition is apparent when government is
divided but is suppressed when government is unified).
70.
To account for the possibility that features of the political environment apart from
the presence of divided or unified government drive these results, we estimated several alternative
model specifications. First, we re-ran Model 1 in Table 2 with fixed effects for each President and
Senate Majority Leader pair during the period. (This model omitted the Divided Govt covariate
to avoid perfect multicollinearity. In addition, because Senator Trent Lott and Senator Harry Reid
split majority-leader duties in 2001, we ran the analysis twice, coding 2001 for Senator Lott in the
first specification and for Senator Reid in the second.) Only the estimate for the George W. BushBill Frist fixed effect (2003-2006), which was positive, approached conventionally accepted levels
of statistical significance ( p = 0.089). Second, we re-ran the model with fixed effects for each pair
of the President and the Senate leader of the other party than the President’s. Here, only the
George W. Bush-Harry Reid estimate (2005-2008), which also was positive, approached statistical
significance at conventional levels (p = 0.067). Third, we re-ran the model with dummy variables
for a Republican President, GOP Senate majority, and the interaction of the two. (This model also
omitted Divided Govt for the same reason as above.) Here, only the interaction term, which once
again was positive, approached conventionally accepted levels of statistical significance ( p =
0.086). In sum, virtually every coefficient estimate in these three models suggests a null result. In
all three models, the only estimates that approach conventionally accepted levels of statistical significance correspond to the mid-2000s. That the mid-2000s is late in the study period is consistent
with our claim that a time trend best explains these data.
Neither is it the case that congressional staffing levels have risen, thereby creating a deeper
pool of qualified candidates for executive positions. In fact, congressional employment figures
have dropped precipitously over the past several decades. See Vital Statistics on Congress,
BROOKINGS INST. 1 tbl. 5-1 (2017) https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/vitalstats_ch5_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/XRS5-XRFT] (reporting a secular decline in policy-focused
committee positions, from 3,437 in 1979 to 2,262 in 2012).
71.
See TIM FUTING LIAO, I NTERPRETING PROBABILITY MODELS: LOGIT, PROBIT,
AND OTHER GENERALIZED LINEAR M ODELS 11-21 (1994). In Model 1, for instance, the predicted probability of a new appointee in 1980 having prior Hill experience is 6.5% (with a 95%
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the growth over the past several decades in the predicted probability that
a new appointee will have prior Hill experience.

0.4
0.3
0.2
0.0

0.1

Predicted Probability

0.5

Figure 3: Predicted Probability that a New Appointee Has Hill
Experience

1980

1990

2000

2010

Generating individual predicted probability figures for each of the
eleven agencies yields broadly similar results.72 The conclusion from these
analyses is clear: the past several decades have witnessed a significant and
sustained increase in the appointment of former congressional staffers to
these agencies. Where once it was rare to find Hill staffers on the daises of
independent commissions and boards, today they figure prominently.
II. Causes
What is the cause of the rise of the former Hill staffer serving on independent commissions? We propose that it is not coincidental that this
trend occurred in the midst of a period in which Congress’s relative role in

confidence interval of 3.2% to 9.8%). By 2018, that figure is 48.0% (with a 95% confidence interval of 38.1% to 58.8%).
72.
For the EEOC and FEC figures, however, the lower bounds of the confidence intervals hover around zero for the full 1980-2018 period.
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governance otherwise has been in retreat.73 Reacting to their declining
power to achieve their desired ends through traditional legislative processes,74 lawmakers sought out other means of influence. Placing Hill staffers on commissions constitutes a relatively low-cost pathway to exercising
power in our current milieu.
Counterintuitively, Congress’s own pathologies may have led it to focus on appointments. Congressional dysfunction could make the Congressto-agency pathway more attractive for two reasons.75 First, with a waning
role in direct governance, Congress may place greater emphasis on ensuring that individuals who actually set policy have substantial ties to the legislative branch. Second, with the material and psychic rewards for working
on the Hill declining, high-level congressional staffers may feel the pull of
multimember agencies more today than in the past. In the following two
subsections, we consider these two potential pathways in turn.

A. Demand-Side
In this section, we outline several reasons why Congress’s demand for
former Hill staffers to serve as commissioners on independent agencies
may have increased in the past few decades. We then test these theories
against available data.
1. Interbranch Dynamics
With Congress’s exercise of its traditional lawmaking and oversight
functions diminished, lawmakers may view appointing allies onto independent agencies as an alternative means of exercising influence. In recent

73.
See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010); THOMAS MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, T HE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS
IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 97 (2006); Jessica Bulman-Pozen,

From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920, 1938 (2014); Richard L. Hasen, Essay: Political Dysfunction and Constitutional Change, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 989, 993 (2013).
The development also transpired in the years immediately following a series of Supreme Court
decisions striking down statutes designed to give Congress a formal role in the appointment or
removal of executive branch officials. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252 (1991), Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Congress also cannot draft statutory requirements that overly constrain
the President’s choice set for appointments. See Hechinger v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 36
F.3d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1994); supra Section I.A.
74.
See Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065,
2067 (2013) (labeling as conventional wisdom the view that “Congress is hopelessly gridlocked”).
75.
For a recent treatment of congressional dysfunction, see THOMAS MANN & NORMAN
J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM C OLLIDED WITH THE NEW P OLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012).
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years, Congress has passed far fewer laws than a generation ago.76 Existing
laws often delegate significant authority to the executive branch,77 and congressional committees sometimes overlook their oversight function.78 Today, Congress even struggles with more routine tasks, like passing budgets
prior to the start of a new fiscal year and approving increases in the debt
ceiling.79 Facing a reduced role in policymaking, legislators naturally seek alternative means of influence.
At the same time, presidential innovations such as regulatory review
by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) and the use
of White House policy “czars” or councils to coordinate policy among
agencies have strengthened the President’s hand in administration.80 With
the door closing on Congress’s more direct levers of power and White
House power over agencies on the ascent, legislators may be turning to
appointments to indirectly influence policy outcomes.81
Lawmakers’ increasingly turned their attention to appointments in
the late 1970s. The Senate strengthened its financial disclosure requirements for nominees, increased the amount of time its committees spent
holding hearings on nominees, and demonstrated a greater willingness to
place holds on nominees to gain concessions elsewhere from the White
House.82 By the mid-1990s, Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole (R-KS) reg-

76.
See Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and the Problem of Arbitrary
Inaction, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065, 2220-21 (2013).
77.
See Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, 103 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1013-15 (2015)
(describing Congress’s delegation of legislative power to agencies).
78.
See Brian D. Feinstein, Congress in the Administrative State, 95 WASH. U. L. REV.
1189, 1216-20 (2018) (showing that where committee, chamber and agency preferences are misaligned, oversight hearings are less likely to be held); Brian D. Feinstein, Avoiding Oversight: Legislator Preferences and Congressional Monitoring of the Administrative State, 8 J.L. ECON &
POL’Y 23 (2011) (demonstrating that legislators tend to disfavor assignments to oversight-focused
committees); Terry M. Moe, The Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The Presidential Advantage,
in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 425, 442 (Michael Nelson ed., 2003) (arguing
that reelection-oriented legislators have scant incentive to participate in oversight activities).
79.
See Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of Disco: Why the American Political System is
Dysfunctional, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1159, 1193 (2014).
80.
See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space,
125 HARV. L. R EV. 1131, 1176-78 (2012) (discussing White House policy councils); Elana Kagan,
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. R EV. 2245, 2277-81, 2285-90 (2001) (describing the
bolstering of OIRA’s influence in regulatory review during the 1980s).
81.
See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 487 (2008) (observing that
“[p]olitical polarization has shifted the focus of government policymaking away from Congress
and to government agencies,” thus raising the stakes for executive appointments). As we discuss
in this Section, we think other factors have influenced the increasing emphasis that legislators
place on appointments.
82.
See Ho, supra note 41, at 28 (citing Senate studies on the appointments process from
1976 and 1977).
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ularly sent to President Bill Clinton the names of recommended appointees to Republican-designated seats on commissions with partisan-balance
requirements, thus capturing first-mover advantage for this subset of appointments.83
The Senate’s heightened attention to nominees expanded the
timeframe for appointments. Whereas the Senate took an average of 59
days to confirm judicial and executive branch nominees during the Reagan
Administration, that figure rose to 127 days during the Obama Administration.84 Evidence from the Trump Administration suggests the problem
is getting worse—reports of unusually long delays in confirmations
abound.85 Although seemingly in tension with lawmakers’ tendency to
place their own people in the some of these roles, these staffing delays also
support the inference that senators are scrutinizing appointments more,
which is consistent with a desire to play a greater role in this realm.
As one would expect given the stakes, lawmakers’ turn towards appointments did not occur in a vacuum. The White House may have been
aware of the implications of Congress’s growing focus on appointments,
but any measures to counteract it would be costly in several ways.
While we cannot definitively say whether the White House or Senate
has greater power over appointments in general—empirical research on
this question does not yield a firm conclusion86—the Senate has a veto
power on administrative appointments as a practical matter.87 Should the

83.
See Feinstein & Hemel, supra note 39, at 63-64 (2018). The historical record is unclear as to whether this practice began with Senator Dole.
84.
Anne Joseph O’Connell, Shortening Agency and Judicial Vacancies Through Filibuster Reform? An Examination of Confirmation Rates and Delays from 1981 to 2014, 64 DUKE
L.J. 1645, 1669 (2015). Figures refer to the time to confirmation for confirmed nominees only. Id.
The Obama Administration figure is calculated through 2014. Id. Rates of failed nominations were
also higher during the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations than during presidencies
earlier in the observed period. Id. at 1652.
85.
See Anne Joseph O’Connell, After One Year in Office, Trump’s Behind on Staffing
but Making Steady Progress, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 23, 2018) https://www.brookings.edu/research/after-one-year-in-office-trumps-behind-on-staffing-but-making-steady-progress/
[https://perma.cc/D6NK-GTBZ].
86.
See Kelly H. Chang, The President Versus the Senate: Appointments in the American System of Separated Powers and the Federal Reserve, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 319, 343 (2001)
(finding that “sometimes the [P]resident, sometimes the Senate, and sometimes neither” influences appointments to the Federal Reserve); David C. Nixon, Separation of Powers and Appointee Ideology, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 438, 439 (2004) (finding that “[a]ppointee ideology is systematically related to the policy preferences and bargaining positions of [both] presidents and senators”).
87.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transcending

Formalism and Functionalism in Separation-of-Powers Analysis: Reframing the Appointments
Power After Noel Canning, 64 DUKE L.J. 1513, 1524 (2015) (arguing that given the “lack of any
temporal limits on the Senate’s consideration of presidential nominations that require the Senate’s
approval . . . the Framers intended to give the Senate an unreviewable veto power over presidential nominations through the expedient of simply not voting on a pending nomination”).
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Senate reject or fail to act on a presidential nominee, the White House’s
options are limited. The Recess Appointments Clause authorizes the President to unilaterally appoint officials “during the Recess of the Senate,”
but these appointments expire at the conclusion of the Senate’s next session.88 Thus, by not going into recess and instead holding pro forma sessions, the Senate may prevent the President from exercising this power.89
Further, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, which provides a
framework for the unilateral appointment of “acting” officials to serve on
a temporary basis, does not apply to multimember commissions.90 Indeed,
nominations to independent commissions are substantially more likely to
run aground in the Senate than are nominations to other executive positions, which suggests that the Senate exerts greater power over independent commissions than other executive offices.91
While the House plays no constitutional role in appointments,92 its
role in lawmaking, budgeting, and oversight may provide its members with
leverage over appointments. Should House majorities favor a particular
individual for an executive position, they have chits they can call in. The
bottom line is that if the President wants agencies staffed to implement his
or her policies, legislators have several sources of power that they can exert.
Indeed, the political branches’ appointments machinations over the
past several decades sometimes resemble a “Spy Versus Spy” panel: individual senators, with the tacit approval of Senate leadership, use holds to
delay or block consideration of nominees;93 the President then turns to recess appointments to bypass the Senate;94 and the Senate responds by not
adjourning, technically avoiding a recess by holding one-minute sessions
every three business days.95

88.
U.S. C ONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
89.
See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2574 (2014) (stating
that Article II “gives the Senate wide latitude to determine whether and when to have a session”).
Krotoszynski, supra note 87, at 1537-38.
90.
5 U.S.C. § 3349c(1); see O’Connell, supra note 84, at 1699 n.171.
91.
See O’Connell, supra note 84, at 1661-62.
92.
But see U.S. C ONST. Art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (requiring House consent to any Senate recess
longer than three days, which under certain circumstances could compel the Senate to act on a
presidential nominee rather than punt to the President to make a recess appointment).
93.
See Nicholas O. Howard & Jason M. Roberts, The Politics of Obstruction: Republican Holds in the U.S. Senate, 40 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 273, 278-81 (2015).
94.
See Ryan C. Black et al., Assessing Congressional Responses to Growing Presidential Powers: The Case of Recess Appointments, 41 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 570, 582-83 (2011)
(reporting that Sen. John Cornyn offered this rationale for President George W. Bush’s increased
use of recess appointments).
95.
See Jordain Carney, Senate Blocks Trump from Making Recess Appointments over
Break, THE HILL (Aug. 3, 2017, 7:40 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/345261-senateblocks-trump-from-making-recess-appointments-over-break [https://perma.cc/3GHS-8M5Z].
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But even with both branches engaged in an arms’ race regarding appointments,96 lawmakers in some respects have come out ahead, denying
the President the ability to fill key positions in high-profile confirmation
fights.97 Legislators are winning more of these battles today than in the
past, with Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama experiencing
higher rates of failed nominations than did Presidents Ronald Reagan,
George H.W. Bush, or Bill Clinton.98 In sum, as the balance of power between Congress and the President shifted towards the latter in some areas,
lawmakers responded by asserting their power in appointments, an area
less amenable to a presidential counterpunch.
2. The Advantages of Staffers
If members of Congress have tried to counter the rise of presidential
power in administration by putting favored personnel at the helm of independent commissions, another question presents itself: Why would they focus on Hill staffers specifically? After all, if legislators wanted to increase
their power over policy, they could choose other members of the political
class with similar ideological commitments.99
Staffers offer three advantages for members of Congress above what
other potential appointees outside the Hill, including political allies, can
deliver. First, lawmakers can gauge their ideological commitments through
frequent, in-person interaction.100 Second, staffers-turned-commissioners
may be more pliable to congressional demands because they believe that
they “owe” their patron in Congress for both their commission seat and
their previous position on the Hill, whereas for other commissioners, legislators hold only one favor in the bank. Third, staffers operate in an institution where loyalty to one’s political principal and party is emphasized.101
96.
See Devins & Lewis, supra note 81, at 488 (discussing the “transform[ation of] the
nomination and confirmation of independent-agency heads,” with “White House vetting . . . and
the Senate’s corresponding power to confirm . . . becom[ing] especially consequential”). Cf. Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through the New Presidentialism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 227, 235 (1998) (asserting that greater presidential involvement in administration, “[b]y
raising the stakes for other actors in the system . . . may trigger an oversight arms race”).
97.
See, e.g., Ho, supra note 41, at 28.
98.
See O’Connell, supra note 84, at 1660-61.
99.
See Feinstein & Hemel, supra note 39, at 26 (discussing partisan polarization among
the elite circles from which appointees to independent agencies are drawn).
100.
See Sara L. Hagedorn, Taking the Lead: Congressional Staffers and Their Role in
the Policy Process 144 (2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado),
https://scholar.colorado.edu/concern/graduate_thesis_or_dissertations/4t64gn319
[https://perma.cc/HT7Z-8SRZ] (showing that staffers tend to hold the same ideological outlooks
as their bosses).
101.
See Jacob M. Montgomery & Brendan Nyhan, The Effects of Congressional Staff
Networks in the U.S. House of Representatives, 79 J. POL. 745, 745 (2017) (asserting that staffers
are “increasingly loyal to parties rather than members”); Robert Salisbury & Kenneth Shepsle,
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Placing these individuals—loyal to their legislative principals and inculcated in the folkways of Congress—in high-ranking executive offices may
constitute a significant means of influencing administration. Further, as we
explain in Section III.B, the growth of this Congress-to-agency channel has
in fact changed the culture of these agencies—and perhaps ultimately affected their policy outcomes.
In light of Congress’s growing dysfunction concerning lawmaking and
other core tasks, how could its members find increasing success in placing
Hill staffers onto commissions?102 For one, shepherding a nominee through
Congress may attract less attention and require fewer resources than passing a law: no turf wars among committees for jurisdiction, no omnibus bundles, no amendment tree gamesmanship on the floor, no prospect of convoluted conference committee negotiations with the House, and so on. Instead, the relevant Senate committee and the floor ultimately are faced
with a simple question: “Will the Senate advise and consent to this nomination?”103 Further, in contrast to the time and resource costs necessary to
place a new issue on Congress’s agenda—for example, lobbying one’s colleagues and holding hearings to gin up interest—the Constitution places
the agenda-setting function for appointments squarely with the President;104 no congressional effort is required.105 Given these advantages, it
makes sense that members of a resource-constrained and increasingly dysfunctional institution would focus on appointments.
The rise of Hill staffers may also be an elegant solution to another
problem: the need for potential appointees to credibly signal their ideological bona fides. We turn to this next.

Congressional Staff Turnover and the Ties-That-Bind, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 381, 394 (1981) (asserting that staffers are loyal to the legislator who hired them and supervises them).
102.
We do not intend to suggest that the Senate’s role in appointments is insusceptible
to the dysfunction pervading other congressional functions. Indeed, delays in staffing appointed
positions across the executive branch have increased in recent decades. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REV . 913, 953-54
(2009).
103.
STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE r. XXXI(1), S. DOC. NO. 113-18 (2013),
https://www.rules.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CDOC-113sdoc18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JHZ3VWKL].
104.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the President “by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Officers of the United States,” except for certain
proscribed positions).
105.
Indeed, Congress does not even need to incur search costs to determine whether a
vacancy exists, as the Vacancies Act requires the heads of agencies to report this information to
Congress. See 5 U.S.C. § 3349(a) (2018).
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3. The Rise of Programmatic Parties
The ascent of “programmatic” political parties also encourages the
appointment of staffers-turned-commissioners.106 A generation or two ago,
congressional elections were mostly local affairs, emphasizing patronage,
pork-barrel projects, and the individual candidate’s “home style,” or reputation and persona in the district.107 Today, by contrast, national political
issues—on which the two parties typically take clear, unified, and distinct
positions—dominate both campaigns and governance.108 In Professor
James Q. Wilson’s formulation, party membership has moved from a focus
on solidary and material incentives to an emphasis on purposive ones,
namely, advancing an ideological vision and associated programmatic
goals.109
It is easy to see how these changes could lead the political branches
to emphasize ideological purity when considering potential appointees.
Professor Nancy Scherer describes how this transformation played out in
the context of the appointment of lower federal judges:
Under both the old and modern party systems, party activists closely monitored the selection of lower court judges. But while local party activists under the old party system viewed lower court judgeships as jobs to be distributed to friends and campaign contributors, in the modern political era, party
and issue activists view judicial appointments as crucial policy matters.110

Replace “lower court judges” with “commissioners of independent
agencies,” and the argument resembles the one we are making. The rise of
party and issue activists, the donor class, and party-affiliated media alters
the incentives of political actors in making appointments, encouraging the
elevation of individuals who have demonstrated fidelity to shared objectives. Former congressional staffers’ tenures on the Hill—spending long
hours advancing their principal’s policy goals for relatively low pay111—
106.
See MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE STATE: THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE 3 (1993).
107.
See RICHARD FENNO, HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS
(1973).
108.
See generally RICHARD FENNO, CONGRESS AT THE GRASSROOTS (1998) (contrasting the old and new emphases in congressional campaigns).
109.
See JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS (1995). While the reasons for
these changes lie beyond this Article’s scope, they include a gradual partisan realignment that
sorted activists and politicians into two internally cohesive, polarized parties; donors’ and primary
voters’ growing importance in elections; and news media with a more national scope. See Paul
Frymer, Debating the Causes of Party Polarization in America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 335 (2011).
110.
NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER
FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS 13 (2005).
111.
See infra Part II.B.
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send a costly signal that they will remain committed to these goals once
installed for a fixed term on a commission. That signal is particularly important when—as now—the parties and their affiliated activists, donors,
and media place great value on advancing policy goals.
Recent battles about net neutrality are illustrative. In 2015, the FCC,
headed by Obama appointee Tom Wheeler, commanding a 3-2 majority
for Democrats, promulgated “net neutrality” rules reclassifying internet
services as telecommunications services, thus bringing them under Title II
of the Communications Act of 1934.112 Three years later, FCC Chair Ajit
Pai issued new rules undoing the old ones.113 Pai’s nomination to be Chair,
a position with unusual authority among independent commissions, was in
effect a referendum on whether to keep net neutrality. As a consequence,
Pai found himself at the center of something that could only be described
as a high-profile, mass political campaign. During the rulemaking, the FCC
received millions of comments on its website, many of which were duplicative and thus highly suggestive of an organized effort.114 Democrats
made reinstatement of the Obama-era rules a campaign issue,115 and Pai
witnessed protests at his home and even death threats.116 Pai, a former Hill
staffer, ultimately delivered for the Trump Administration, which wanted
to roll back these rules.117
Several features of this anecdote are noteworthy. First, that federal
policy regarding regulation of the internet was being made by the FCC
through the interpretation of a nearly century-old statute, rather than by
Congress, captures the decline in Congress’s direct role in policymaking,
as discussed in Section II.A.1. Second, the policy issue garnered widespread public attention, with a clear partisan split between supporters and
opponents. Third, the instrument for delivering a policy change for the
Trump Administration was a former Hill staffer, who is viewed by both
sides as an ideological purist. Finally, the example illustrates how Congress
can install its personnel onto commissions without necessarily triggering

112.
113.
114.

See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015).

See Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311 (2018).
See Paul Hitlin, Kenneth Olmstead & Skye Toor, Public Comments to the Federal
Communications Commission About Net Neutrality Contain Many Inaccuracies and Duplicates,
PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/11/29/public-comments-to-the-federal-communications-commission-about-net-neutrality-contain-many-inaccuracies-and-duplicates/ [https://perma.cc/XK5S-8AK3].
115.
See Harper Neidig, Can Net Neutrality Be a Potent Political Issue for Democrats?,
THE HILL (Dec. 24, 2017), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/366177-can-net-neutrality-be-apotent-political-issue-for-democrats [https://perma.cc/WQW2-HDAM].
116.
See Cecilia Kang, Man Charged with Threatening To Kill Ajit Pai’s Family, N.Y.
TIMES (June 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/29/technology/ajit-pai-death-threat.html
[https://perma.cc/8P3K-WFCU].
117.
See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 7, 2019, 7:51 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1181175266409889793.
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pushback from the White House. Where the same party controls the White
House and Senate, as was the case at the time of Pai’s appointment, partisans in both branches benefit from the appointment of former Hill staffers
who are able to credibly signal their ideological bona fides.
4. Inter-Agency Variation
The story we have told so far is incomplete; Congress’s demand for
staffers-turned-commissioners is not uniform across agencies. Table 3, below, reproduces the same three regression models reported in Table 2.
Whereas Table 2 did not report the agency-level fixed effects, Table 3 does.
Table 3: Staffers-Turned-Commissioners Over Time & Across Agencies
Model 1
Year

Model 2

Model 3

0.065**
(0.012)
0.0001*
(0.00005)

Year Cubed

1914-1930

1.436
(0.904)

1931-1972

0.166
(0.827)

1973-2018

2.494**
(0.843)

CPSC

2.096**
(0.753)

1.717**
(0.587)

1.725**
(0.586)

EEOC

0.359
(0.877)

0.330
(0.689)

0.380
(0.688)

FCC

1.768*
(0.703)

0.112*
(0.508)

1.122*
(0.505)
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FEC

1.254
(1.254)

1.622**
(0.562)

1.604**
(0.559)

Fed

—

—

—

FERC

2.144**
(0.694)

1.998***
(0.536)

1.933***
(0.531)

FTC

0.929
(0.777)

2.230***
(0.476)

2.292***
(0.478)

NLRB

1.153
(0.709)

1.170*
(0.511)

1.172*
(0.508)

NRC

1.519*
(0.706)

1.201*
(0.514)

1.276*
(0.512)

NTSB

1.280
(0.755)

1.096
(0.588)

1.094
(0.588)

SEC

0.911
(0.750)

0.969
(0.511)

0.989
(0.507)

Divided Govt

-0.433
(0.272)

-0.275
(0.218)

-0.352
(0.212)

Unit of analysis: appointments and reappointments to eleven boards and
commissions. Dependent variable: whether appointee previously worked
for or served in Congress. Model: logistic regression (all models); Model 2
contains a third-degree polynomial transformation of Year (Year & Year2
terms included in model, but unreported in table); Model 3 employs
regression splines at 1914-1930, 1931-1972, and 1973-2018. Agency
covariates modeled as fixed effects; baseline category: the Federal Reserve.
Period: 1980-2018 (Model 1); 1914-2018 (Model 2); 1914-2018 (Model 3).
Observations: 459 (Model 1); 977 (Model 2); 977 (Model 3). Pseudo-R2:
0.142 (Model 1); 0.118 (Model 2); 0.111 (Model 3). *** signifies p < 0.001,
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10.
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The various agency fixed effects reported in Table 3 complicate the
narrative. Compared to the Federal Reserve—which is the baseline category and the included agency with historically the smallest proportion of
former Hill staffers among its leaders—several agencies have a significantly greater likelihood of including former Hill staffers among their leadership, controlling for time and the presence of divided government.
Namely, the positive coefficient estimates achieve conventionally accepted
levels of statistical significance in at least one model for the CPSC, FCC,
FEC, FERC, FTC, NLRB, and NRC. Controlling for the time trend and
effect of divided government, the Hill-to-agency current is particularly
strong for these agencies.
What accounts for these differences across agencies? One possibility
is that the observed variation in appointments is the result of a self-reinforcing process. Imagine the following scenario. For idiosyncratic reasons,
a Hill staffer is appointed to a commission for the first time. Adaptive expectations then set in;118 the next time a seat on that commission is open,
political actors fail to agree on a candidate, decide that the first stafferturned-commissioner is working out well enough, and so appoint a second
one. The process then repeats. At the same time, with each subsequent
appointment, staffers-turned-commissioners’ patrons in Congress gain
knowledge of how to successfully elevate someone to a commissionership.
These learning effects give them an advantage in placing their favored candidates on commissions in the future.119 The result: a positive feedback
loop develops, with the boost in staffers-turned-commissioners attributable to path-dependent development rather than conscious choice to elevate Hill staffers.
Although this path-dependence theory cannot be empirically evaluated, there is much to recommend it. Not only can it explain the variation
in staffers-turned-commissioners across agencies, but it also offers a rationale for why the other theories yield null results. It very well may be
efficient for political actors to take into account, for example, the commission’s ideology or the political climate at the time, when deciding whether
to appoint a congressional staffer. But positive feedback processes are
rarely path-efficient and often lead to one of multiple possible equilibria.120
Alternative explanations for these differences across agencies focus
on idiosyncratic characteristics of each particular commission, or of the
overall political climate at the time of particular appointments. Empirical
tests of four of these alternative explanations yield null results.
118.
See PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME 24 (2004) (defining adaptive expectations).
119.
See id. (“Projections about future aggregate use patterns lead individuals to adapt
their actions in ways that help to make those expectations come true.”).
120.
See id. at 18, 44.
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First, we examine whether agencies’ political orientations offer an explanation. We operationalize political orientation using liberal-to-conservative ideological scores developed by Professors Joshua Clinton and
David Lewis.121 As a first cut, we regress the proportion of each agency’s
commissioners during the 2005-2018 period that were former Hill staffers
on the agency’s ideological score.122 Figure 4 displays the results. Although
the regression line in Figure 4 shows a slight negative relationship between
an agency’s conservativism and the proportion of its commissioners that
hail from Capitol Hill, the associated confidence intervals are far too wide
to support a clear connection.

121.
Clinton and Lewis’s measure is based on a survey of journalists, think-tankers, and
bureaucracy experts conducted in 2006. See Joshua D. Clinton & David E. Lewis, Expert Opinion,
Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences, 16 POL. ANALYSIS 3, 5 (2008). Because Clinton
and Lewis’s survey does not include the Fed or FERC, these agencies are excluded from this analysis.
122.
We use a logit model with standard errors clustered by agency. As an alternative
specification, we also use a two-limit tobit model censored at 0 and 1. Both models yield substantially similar results. We start at 2005 based on the dramatic increase in staffers-turned-commissioners around that year. The results reported in Figure 4 are robust to different start years.
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Figure 4: Agency Ideology & Presence of
Staffers-Turned-Commissioners

Second, we examine whether staffers-turned-commissioners are more
common on lower-profile commissions. If lawmakers view appointments
as patronage plums to reward longtime staffers, one might expect the phenomenon to be concentrated in lower-salience, less consequential agencies. After all, getting one’s employee a sinecure on an obscure commission
may incur fewer political costs than installing that individual on a commission such as the FCC.
Third, in another variation of the patronage story, we consider
whether staffers-turned-commissions are concentrated on agencies that
address relatively less-sophisticated subjects. By analogy, consider the
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practice of presidents appointing their campaign supporters to cushy ambassadorships in European capitals, while reserving positions in countries
with more complex relationships with the U.S. to expert career diplomats.123 If a similar dynamic is at play in the administrative state, we would
expect the presence of staffers-turned-commissioners to be negatively correlated with the complexity of an agency’s subject matter.
Finally, we examine whether a possible association between an
agency’s ideology and the presence of former Hill staffers depends on period-specific political dynamics.
Regression models testing all of these hypotheses yield null results.124
We cannot reject the null hypotheses that any of these alternative explanations—major features of the overall political climate at the time of appointment, whether the commission is high- or low-profile, or whether it
addresses complex subject matter—have no connection to the likelihood
that a former Hill staffer is appointed to a given commission.
***

See Dav Seminara, In U.S., Selling Ambassadorships To Highest Bidder Has Long
WASH. DIPLOMAT (Feb. 28, 2013), https://washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&id=8985:in-us-selling-ambassadorships-to-highest-bidder-has-long-history&Itemid=428 [https://perma.cc/3WXH-WC6A].
124.
To test the political-climate account, we regress whether each individual hails from
Capitol Hill on various features of the political climate at the time of the appointment. To capture
any period-specific political influences on appointments, we include year-level fixed effects. Alternative specifications replace these year-level fixed effects with (i) fixed effects for each President-Senate Majority Leader pair; (ii) fixed effects for each pair of the President and Senate leader
of the other party than the President; and (iii) dummy variables for a Republican President, GOP
Senate majority, and the interaction of the two. Each model employs logistic regression with
agency-clustered standard errors. All models also include the relevant agency’s Clinton-Lewis ideological score as an independent variable. The analysis encompasses the period 2005 to 2018.
To test the lower-profile-commissions account , for each commissioner appointed after 2004,
we regress whether that commissioner formerly worked for Congress on a measure capturing the
relevant agency’s public profile. We operationalize “public profile” as the number of times the
agency was mentioned in the New York Times in the year of the appointment. As above, we estimate several alternative specifications with different variables capturing period-specific political
dynamics. The model is a logistic regression with agency-clustered standard errors.
To test the less-sophisticated-commissions account, for each commissioner appointed during the
period of study, we regress whether that individual previously worked in Congress on two
measures of regulatory complexity: the number of regulatory restrictions issued by the agency in
the previous year and, in an alternative model, the total word length of those regulations. The data
for these two measures were obtained from Patrick A. McLaughlin & Oliver Sherouse, RegData
U.S. 3.2 Agency Summary Dataset, QUANTGOV, https://www.quantgov.org/bulk-download. We
estimate similar alternative specifications as before to capture period-specific fixed-effects. All
models employ logistic regression with agency-clustered standard errors. Because the data source
used here ends in 2017, this analysis covers 2005-2017 rather than 2005-2018 in the previous models. Contra our prediction, the coefficient estimates are positive in all eight of the models that we
estimate. All eight, however, fall short of statistical significance. (p=0.13 in one model, p=0.14 in
another, and the standard errors dwarf the coefficient estimates in the other six models.)
123.

History,
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In this section, we examined the demand-side of the market for commissioners, focusing on lawmakers’ incentives to place former congressional staffers in these positions. We argued that the demand for staffers
as commissioners has recently increased because of the relative fall in congressional power over policy. As one pathway of power has been weakened, legislators naturally have resorted to alternative, lower-cost means
of influencing policy. On the other side of the equation, although the White
House decides whom to nominate for these positions, it may have less relative power than is apparent, since the Senate can act as a veto gate over
the White House’s ability to execute its policy choices through appointees.
At the same time, increasingly cohesive and ideologically oriented parties
arguably favor appointing ideological true believers to commissions; in this
climate, Hill staffers’ demonstrated commitment to their party’s policy
goals makes them particularly well-suited as appointees.

B. Supply-Side
Continuing with our market metaphor, we next consider whether a
demand-focused account may be only half of the story. Changing workplace dynamics on Capitol Hill also may have influenced the supply of individuals seeking to work as commissioners on independent agencies.
Namely, it is possible that growing congressional dysfunction may have induced senior staffers to head to the exits in increasing numbers. A 1995
Congressional Management Foundation report described employment in
Congress in dismal terms: “Staff typically work exceedingly long, unpredictable hours that leave little time for outside activities; receive lower pay
than both private sector and federal executive branch staff; work in
cramped quarters with no privacy; exercise minimal control over their
work schedules; and have virtually no job security.”125
The situation has only worsened since then. Between 2009 and 2013,
inflation-adjusted salaries declined by twenty percent for House counsels
and thirteen percent for House legislative directors.126 In the Senate, counsel and legislative directors saw similar decreases in salary.127 Further, staffing levels for policy positions have been in decline for decades; whereas in
1979 committees in both chambers employed a total of 3,437 staffers, by

125.
Nicole Cooper, Working in Congress: Introduction, CONG. MGMT . FOUND. (Feb. 3,
2007),
https://www.congressfoundation.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=117&Itemid=50 [https://perma.cc/55LJ-A9K6].
126.
See Lee Drutman et. al, Congress Must Invest in Its Own Capacity Again, R STREET
INST. (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.rstreet.org/2016/03/09/congress-must-invest-in-its-own-capacityagain/ [https://perma.cc/P4B7-WD3E].
127.
See id. (reporting that salaries for individuals holding these positions in the Senate
declined fourteen percent and eleven percent, respectively, over this period).
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2012, that figure had fallen to 2,262 individuals128—presumably limiting opportunities for advancement in a shrinking workforce. And while staffing
levels and salaries declined, the work may have become more difficult; the
size and scope of the executive branch that these committee staffers are
charged with overseeing more than doubled in real terms between 1979
and 2012.129 These developments may make working for Congress a lessattractive career option—and increase the attractiveness of exit.
To be clear, we do not claim that the typical high-level Hill staffer
would prefer to be an SEC Commissioner because of a growing pay or
work-quality gap between Congress and the SEC. Plainly, a seat on a highprofile commission is likely to be a more attractive career option than serving as a top aide to a powerful senator or committee in any era. But what
about a position on a less consequential commission? When Congress was
well-functioning and the employment structure facilitated spending one’s
career on Capitol Hill,130 a star staffer for an influential lawmaker conceivably might prefer to stay put rather than accept a fixed-term appointment
to a minority-party seat on a backwater commission. If exit decisions are
made at the margins, then we would expect to see more departures among
policy-motivated staffers as Congress’s policymaking capacity and its attractiveness as a workplace both have waned.
Compounding matters, service on a commission simultaneously has
become less financially attractive for high-fliers in the private sector. Over
the past generation, the income gains for the most highly paid individuals,
virtually all of whom presumably work outside of government, have far
outpaced those of other workers.131 Members of one common group from

128.
Vital Statistics on Congress, supra note 70, at 1 tbl. 5-1.
129.
See Historical Tables, OFF. MGMT. & B UDGET 28, tbl.
1.3,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/historical-tables/ [https://perma.cc/F5KH-9ZEN].
130.
See Sarah Binder, The Dysfunctional Congress, 18 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 85, 91-92
(2015) (identifying the mid-1960s through 1970s as the post-war period in which Congress’s
agenda was most expansive); Kenneth A. Shepsle, The Changing Textbook Congress, in CAN THE
GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 239 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989) (describing “an
institutional bargain that gave prominence to committees and the jurisdictional imperative” of the
Congresses of the mid-twentieth century).
131.
See Chad Stone et al., A Guide to Statistics on Historical Trends in Income Inequality, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 9-10 (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-28-11pov_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/JP76-BCPT]. The pay gap between private- and public-sector workers also has grown. See Comparing the Compensation of Federal and
Private-Sector Employees, 2011 to 2015, CONG. B UDGET OFF. 10, 15 (Apr. 2017),
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/52637-federalprivatepay.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZH44-NM6K] (finding that the total compensation was lower for federal employees with a professional or doctorate degree than for private-sector employees with similar
attributes).
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which commissioners are selected, law firm partners, have seen their incomes rise precipitously.132 Almost twenty years ago, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist recognized that the increase in opportunity costs for public service could discourage “many of the very best lawyers” from judicial service.133
A similar dynamic may be playing out among the pool of potential
executive appointees. Consider the pre-appointment professional lives of
two FTC commissioners: Chair Joseph Simons and Rebecca Slaughter.
Slaughter arrived at the FTC after serving as chief counsel to Senator
Charles Schumer,134 a position that would have paid no more than $111,000
in 2013.135 Simons, by contrast, came to the FTC from the partnership of
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, where his most recent partnership share was $1.9 million.136 While income gaps between big-firm partners and federal officials are nothing new, the size of Simons’s pay cut may
make others in a similar position think twice about the opportunity cost of
government service. Taken together, the decline in pay for high-level staffers and the massive increase in pay for high-level attorneys could shift the
supply of potential commissioners away from the private sector and to the
halls of Congress.
Digging deeper, we ask whether a concomitant decline in appointments from the private sector has accompanied the rise of staffers-turnedcommissioners. To answer this question, we examine changes over the
1934-2018 period in the proportion of newly appointed SEC commissioners’ with certain pre-appointment employment. Specifically, we examine
whether each new commissioner arrived at the SEC immediately from one
of the following positions: (a) congressional staff or member; (b) SEC staff;
(c) other executive branch position; and (d) securities-related private-sec-

132.
See Albert Yoon, Love’s Labor Lost? Judicial Tenure Among Federal Court
Judges: 1945-2000, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1029, 1038 (2003) (finding greater increases in the salaries of
law firm partners than those of most professions, including federal judges).
133.
William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Statement Before the
National Commission on the Public Service (July 15, 2002), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeech/sp_07-15-02 [https://perma.cc/E945-A3AH].
134.
See Cecilia Kang, ‘I Don’t Feel Superhuman. I Feel Like a Mom Who Has a Career.’, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/31/technology/governmentmom.html [https://perma.cc/2NWL-85CT].
135.
See R. ERIC PETERSEN, LARA E. C HAUSOW & A MBER HOPE WILHELM, C ONG.
RES. SERV ., R43774, STAFF PAY LEVELS FOR SELECTED POSITIONS IN SENATORS ’ OFFICES,
FY2009-FY2013 10, tbl. 6 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43774.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NBKBGCG].
136.
See Mike Scarcella & C. Ryan Barber, Joseph Simons of Paul Weiss, Trump’s FTC
Chair Pick, Reports $1.9M in Partner Share, NAT. L.J. (Feb. 2, 2018, 9:50 AM),
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/sites/nationallawjournal/2018/02/02/joseph-simons-ofpaul-weiss-trumps-ftc-chair-pick-reports-1-9m-in-partner-share [https://perma.cc/BKM6-W56P].
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tor work (in practice, securities lawyers). As before, we use Professor David Nixon’s biographical dataset for 1934-2000 and collect our own data
from internet sources for 2001-2018.
Figure 5 displays our findings. 137
Figure 5: Proportion of New SEC Commissioners by Most Recent
Work Experience

Our claim that increased opportunity costs for individuals in the private sector to serve in government has shifted the SEC’s compositional
balance in favor of former Hill staffers does not find support in Figure 5.
Instead, Figure 5(d) shows that the proportion of commissions hailing from

137.
Panel C aggregates the following codes from Nixon’s dataset: other federal agency
staff, unrelated public sector, appointive federal commissioner/agency head, related military service, related public sector, and ambassadorial and international commission. Panel D aggregates
direct and indirect employment by regulated industry, with indirect employment including legal
services and consulting. See Nixon, supra note 56, at 7.
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the private sector has remained steady for almost sixty years.138 Still, the
trend towards appointing staffers-turned-commissioners appears to have
come at the expense of SEC staffers and other executive branch employees, not private-sector workers. Even though the data concerning the SEC
does not support the public-private sector pay gap hypothesis, because the
figure examines a single agency—and an unusually high-profile one at
that—we are not ready to reject this possible explanation for agencies writ
large. Whether other commissions exhibit a similar pattern is a promising
area for future research.
In addition to the above pay-related dynamics, congressional dysfunction may make executive appointments less attractive to job candidates
who are not currently working on the Hill. Consider that the average time
from nomination to confirmation for all executive and judicial appointees
has more than doubled from the Reagan to the Obama Administrations.139
Failed nominations also have crept upward, from eighteen percent of all
nominations under Reagan to twenty-eight percent under Obama,140 with
even higher failure rates for appointees to independent commissions.141
Remaining in limbo for a prolonged period may be particularly disruptive
to nominees with existing careers outside of politics and those contemplating a long-distance move to Washington to accept a position. Observing
the growing proportion of nominees hailing from the District of Columbia
or an adjacent state, Professor Anne Joseph O’Connell raises the possibility that the length and unpredictability of the confirmation process “may
be narrowing the pool of top officials.”142
But whereas an individual living outside of Washington or working
outside of politics might view the confirmation process as disruptive to her
life, congressional staffers do not face these concerns to nearly the same
degree. Perversely, the delay and uncertainty that Congress has injected
into the confirmation process may advantage Hill staffers at the expense
of other potential nominees.
In summary, several related trends may jointly contribute to an increase in the supply of staffers-turned-commissioners: increasingly long
hours, low job security, and reduced pay push Hill staffers towards the exits, while simultaneously, the greater share of national income received by
high-earners encourages law partners and other potential commissioners
from the private sector to stay put. That public-sector employees and those

138.
Since our data cannot distinguish between job functions within the private sector,
however, one must take these findings with a grain of salt. For instance, there still may be a substitution of higher-prestige law partners in favor of lower-prestige ones.
139.
O’Connell, supra note 84, at 1669. The Obama figure refers to the 2009-2014 period.
140.
Id. at 1660-61.
141.
Id. at 1652.
142.
Id. at 1653.
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living in the Washington metropolitan area may be better able to bear the
challenges of increasingly lengthy confirmation processes may also tip the
balance towards staffers-turned-commissioners.
An alternative supply-side story also exists. Whereas, in past generations, an ambitious young policy wonk aiming for a commissionership
might have begun her career at an agency, law firm, or any number of other
places, today she may observe the growing staffer-to-commissioner pipeline and instead decide to work for Congress. In this telling, the early glimmerings of a staffer-to-commissioner trend becomes self-reinforcing, with
path-dependent, herd behavior among prospective commissioners fueling
the trend. If that is the case, then agencies may be populated with individuals with the same qualities as commissioners prior to the rise of the
staffer-to-commissioner pipeline, with the only difference being the particular lines on those individuals’ résumés.
If one believes this alternative story, then why would one care if members of Washington’s striver class punch their tickets by working in Congress or somewhere else? If the same sorts of people are seated at commission daises in either case, then why does it matter whether they previously
worked for Congress? Part III addresses this question. As that part shows,
the experience of working for Congress may have profound consequences
for one’s professional enculturation. To the extent that staffers-turnedcommissioners import Congress’s norms of behavior onto independent
commissions, that dynamic may impact the functioning of these commissions.
III. Consequences
In this Part, we address the consequences of the increased likelihood
of commissions being run, in whole or part, by former Hill staffers on the
functioning and effectiveness of these bodies. The following Section discusses possible effects of the Congress-to-commission pipeline on commissions’ relationships with other actors. Namely, we suggest that this phenomenon may enable Congress to exert greater influence on independent
regulatory commissions, bolster congressional support for commissions’
activities, and perhaps even enhance commissions’ democratic accountability.
Next, we address how the phenomenon may influence agencies’ internal functioning. Here, we are less sanguine. On one hand, a career on Capitol Hill may provide an education in political tactics and congressional
culture, which—for better or worse—may be imported to independent regulatory commissions. On the other hand, greater knowledge of legislative
intent and legislative history of the laws that their agencies administer may
enable staffers-turned-commissioners to better implement their statutory
mandates.
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A. Extra-Agency
1. Strengthening Congress’s Role
The staffers-turned-commissioners phenomenon offers distinct benefits to Congress. As explained in Part II, the timing of this trend suggests
that Congress intended to place former staffers on commissions as a reaction to other developments that weakened Congress’s relative role in administration.143 It is easy to see how Congress’s turn towards appointing its
former staffers to commissioners could strengthen Congress’s hand.
Beginning with the Reagan Administration, presidents have known
that appointing loyalists to administrative agencies can be an effective
strategy for influencing agency decision-making.144 Whereas, according to
an American Bar Association (ABA) report, prior presidents “ha[d] been
loath to let it appear that they were influencing regulatory agencies,”145
President Reagan emphasized personal loyalty and ideological congruence
in making appointments.146 This practice has increased in subsequent administrations, with presidents aggressively using appointments to encourage agencies to march in lockstep with White House priorities.147
That Congress would subsequently embrace this strategy is unsurprising. Conventional wisdom holds that independent agencies lie within Congress’s sphere of influence more than the President’s.148 Writing for the
Court in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Justice Antonin Scalia asserted
that “independent agencies are sheltered not from politics but from the
President, and . . . their freedom from [p]residential oversight (and protection) has simply been replaced by increased subservience to congressional

143.
144.
145.

See supra Section II.A.
See Kagan, supra note 80, at 2277.

COMM’N ON LAW & THE ECON., AM. BAR ASS’N, FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS
(1979).
146.
See Kagan, supra note 80, at 2277.
147.
See David J. Barron, Foreword: From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Polarization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1096 (2008).
148.
See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The Presidential Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV . 1, 115 (1994) (“[Agency] independence can be understood as a form of [congressional] aggrandizement.”); Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down: Independent Agencies
and Chevron Deference, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 449 (2006) (“‘Congress is quite jealous of its
hegemony over the independent agencies, and can be expected to reach strongly to any executive
poaching.’ . . . Congress’s prerogatives [are] usually not completely lost on agency commissioners.”
(quoting Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 350
(1991))); Antonin Scalia, Historical Anomalies in Administrative Law, SUPREME COURT HISTORY YEARBOOK 110 (1985) (“Humphrey’s Executor continues to induce the Executive to leave
the policy control of the independent agencies to congressional committees, and fastidiously to
avoid any appearance of influence in those entities.”).
TO REFORM 70
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direction.”149 Indeed, appointees and civil servants at independent commissions report significantly more congressional influence than do employees working in executive departments.150 If Congress endeavors to use appointments to influence administration, independent agencies are a natural place to start.
For an individual member of Congress, placing one’s staffer on an independent commission has obvious advantages.151 But the staffers-turnedcommissioners phenomenon also benefits Congress as an institution in two
respects.
First, a survey of congressional staff reveals that most staffers hold a
“sense of loyalty to the body within which they work,” meaning the Senate
or House, and a subset develop “a sense of loyalty and commitment to the
institution of Congress more broadly.”152 Russell Mills and Jennifer Selin’s
study of detailees—agency personnel temporarily assigned to work for a
congressional committee—offers insights. Mills and Selin find that detailees “can represent the interests and perspectives of the agency, and give
the agency a conduit to [congressional] committee decision making.”153
Perhaps a similar dynamic exists concerning staffers-turned-commissioners, who take the opposite path as agency detailees to Congress.
The degree to which staffers-turned-commissioners exhibit loyalty to
Congress as an institution may differ by staff function and title. Former
committee staffers may feel the institution’s pull more than former personal staffers. Former congressional counsels’ professional training may
lead them to value adherence to general legal norms, whereas former
chiefs of staff may harbor a different role-morality. Evaluation of the various types of congressional staffers that are appointed to commissions is a
promising area for future research.
Second, the Congress-centric social network that a staffer-turnedcommissioner developed while working on Capitol Hill may influence her
behavior as a commissioner. Consider that after the confirmation vote, the
Senate has limited leverage over appointees—and a host of other actors
compete for the appointee’s loyalties. The President exerts some degree of

149.
150.

556 U.S. 502, 523 (2009).
See Joshua D. Clinton, David E. Lewis, & Jennifer L. Selin, Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 387, 394 (2014) (reporting survey
results).
151.
See infra Section II.A.2 (arguing that staffers retain a degree of loyalty and connection to their former principals on the Hill).
152.
See Barbara S. Romzek & Jennifer A. Utter, Congressional Legislative Staff: Political Professionals or Clerks?, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1251, 1266 (1997).
153.
Russell W. Mills & Jennifer L. Selin, Don’t Sweat the Details! Enhancing Congressional Committee Expertise Through the Use of Detailees, 41 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 611, 618 (2017).
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control over independent agencies.154 Narrow, well-organized interest
groups subject to, or benefitting from, the agency’s regulations may “capture” appointees’ attention.155 Moreover, after sustained interactions with
their careerist subordinates, appointees may “go native,” that is acculturate to their agencies, adopting the norms and perspectives of the agency’s
civil service.156
An appointee with a deep social or professional network on Capitol
Hill may be better able to resist these sirens. Observers have noted in other
contexts how officials’ extracurricular networks influence their professional activities. For instance, Professor Daniel Carpenter charts how bureaucrats’ outside-the-Beltway professional networks provide them with
an alternative power base, thereby reducing their reliance on elected officials.157 Similarly, Supreme Court watchers have identified a so-called
“Greenhouse effect,” in which Republican-appointed Justices tack left following their immersion in a liberal Washington legal establishment.158
Like Carpenter’s bureaucrats, staffers-turned-commissioners’ ties
with current legislators and staffers may provide them with a basis of support outside of the executive branch, thereby enabling them to act in ways
in which a commissioner without extra-branch ties could not.159 And to the
extent that staffers-turned-commissioners maintain ties with their former
colleagues on the Hill, these social connections may encourage them to

154.
See Cary Coglianese, Presidential Control of Administrative Agencies: A Debate
over Law or Politics? 12 J. CONST. L. 637, 639 (2010). Presidential control is often indirect, however, through the use of “requests” and permissive language. See id.
155.
See Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1080 (1986); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 B ELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 5 (1971).
156.
See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1302 (2006). The experience of former Energy Secretary Rick
Perry is illustrative. When running for President in 2011, Perry favored abolishing the Department
of Energy. See Katie Reilly, Rick Perry Infamously Forgot About the Department of Energy.
Now He Might Lead It, TIME (Dec. 13, 2016, 7:57 AM), http://time.com/4598910/rick-perry-department-energy-oops-gaffe/ [https://perma.cc/9TTU-6DL7]. Yet as Secretary of Energy, Perry
was a public booster of the Department. See Dan Farber, Rick Perry at the Helm of the Department of . . . What Was That One Again, LEGALPLANET BLOG (Aug. 3, 2017), http://legalplanet.org/2017/08/03/rick-perry-hasnt-been-terrible/ [https://perma.cc/E8F7-MZA2].
157.
DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS: NETWORKS, AND P OLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928, at 15 (2001).
158.
See Fontana & Huq, supra note 69, at 63; accord N EAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE
BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY K EEP: HOW PARTISAN DIVISIONS CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT
88 (2019).
159.
By contrast, most OIRA administrators have a generalist and/or academic background. See Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and
Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1373-77 (2013). Given these individuals’ academic bend,
their “relationships to particular interest groups have . . . been relatively attenuated, reducing the
risks of capture.” Id. at 1377.
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support Congress-favored measures in a similar manner as the Greenhouse effect influences conservative justices.
Prior Hill experience may be particularly important as a bulwark
against going native. According to Professor Bruce Ackerman, when even
appointees with differing views from their civil servants engage in sustained interactions with these mission-focused civil servants, there is a
“great danger” that appointees will “succumb to the pressures of the entrenched ideologues to sustain the preexisting mission of the agency.”160
Civil servants do, in fact, frequently have differing views than agency
heads.161 Further, civil servants may sort into employment based on their
level of commitment to the agency’s mission.162 The result may be, for example, an NLRB staff stocked with labor advocates or a NRC with proponents of nuclear power.163 Accordingly, the political branches may worry
about the prospect of commissioner assimilation into agency culture
through sustained interactions with expert civil servants.
For appointees with deep ties to the White House, sustained interactions with White House officials could provide a partial corrective; while
administration officials are likely to hold the “correct” ideological outlook,
they are unlikely to be experts in the agency’s subject matter. Accordingly,
they are of limited use as a counterweight to the influence of expert civil
servants in the fight for an appointee’s attention.
Appointees from Congress face different circumstances. A Republican Hill staffer-turned-NLRB Board Member may maintain ties with expert Republican staffers on the House Committee on Education and Labor. A liberal staffer-turned-NRC Commissioner may stay connected to
expert Democrats on the Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works. In this way, staffers-turned-commissioners may be embedded in
professional networks that are both ideologically consistent and expert.
These networks enable them to seek out informed second opinions from
their ideological allies when they do not fully trust the views of expert-butideologically dissimilar civil servants.164

160.
(2000).
161.

Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 700-01

See Joshua D. Clinton et al., Separated Powers in the United States: The Ideology
of Agencies, Presidents, and Congress, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 341, 347 (2012).
162.
See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 156, at 1300.
163.
See id.; see also Clinton et al., supra note 161, at 348 (reporting that the NLRB has
the most liberal civil servants of any independent agency, while the NRC has among the most
conservative civil servants).
164.
Cf. Brian D. Feinstein & Daniel J. Hemel, Outside Advisers Inside Agencies, 108
GEO. L.J. 1139, 1203-04 (2020) (positing that advisory committees mitigate the expertise-representativeness tradeoff facing appointees seeking to acquire information).
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In summary, staffers-turned-commissioners’ earlier socialization in
Congress may engender loyalty to that institution, with their social and
professional ties to lawmakers and staff reinforcing that sense of loyalty.
Placing former staffers onto commissions may be particularly effective as
a defense against appointees “going native,” because these appointees are
likely to be connected to lawmakers and staff who are both expert and ideologically similar—a rare combination. By pulling independent commissions closer into Congress’s orbit and guarding against bureaucratic drift,
the presence of staffers-turned-commissioners helps effectuate congressional intent underlying the creation of at least some independent commissions: to project congressional power into the administrative state.165
2. Shoring Up Congressional Support
Staffers-turned-commissioners also may be able to leverage their ties
to Congress to advance their agencies’ interests. Just as lobbying firms and
trade associations hire former lawmakers and staffers to capitalize on these
individuals’ goodwill toward and connections with current legislators,166 so
too could staffers-turned-commissioners’ social and professional ties to
members of Congress benefit their new employers. We consider four
mechanisms by which staffers-turned-commissioners could strengthen the
ties between their agency and Congress—to their agency’s benefit.
First, staffers-turned-commissioners are particularly well-positioned
to advocate before Congress on behalf of their agencies. Commissioners
routinely testify before congressional committees, making the case for
their agency’s budget requests.167 Commissioners also urge Congress to
grant their agencies greater powers or to defend their existing turf.168 For

165.
See Barkow, supra note 29, at 25. We do not take a position on whether this objective is a normative good and acknowledge that some readers will find it troubling. See, e.g., Steven
G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J.
541, 582-83 (1994); cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) (“The Constitution does not
contemplate an active role for Congress in the supervision of officers charged with the execution
of the laws it enacts.”).
166.
See Jordi Blanes i Vidal, Mirko Draca, & Christian Fons-Rosen, Revolving Door
Lobbyists, 102 AM. E CON. REV. 3731, 3746 (2012) (finding that lobbyists are in part valued for
their connections to lawmakers).
167.
See, e.g., Review of the FY2019 Budget Request for the U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission & the SEC: Hearing Before the Financial Servs. & Gen. Gov’t Subcomm. of
the S. Comm. on Appropriations , 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S.
Securities & Exchange Commission), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testimony-financialservices-and-general-government-subcommittee-senate-committee [https://perma.cc/Z3M5SQCR].
168.
See, e.g., Hearing Before the Financial Servs. & Gen. Gov’t Subcomm. Of the H.
Comm. on Appropriations, 111st Cong. (2010) (statement of Nancy Nord, Comm’r, U.S. Consumer Products Safety Commission), https://www.cpsc.gov/s3fs-public/nord03042010_0.pdf
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instance, lawmaker-turned-SEC Chair Christopher Cox performed this
function when he urged his former House colleagues not to substantially
weaken the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.169 When performing these functions,
commissioners essentially serve as lobbyists for their commissions.170 Just
as former Hill staffers are able to leverage their connections in Congress
on behalf of their private-sector clients, staffers-turned-commissioners
may be able to do the same on behalf of their commissions.171
Second, staffers-turned-commissioners could use their knowledge of
Congress’s internal dynamics to reduce conflicts between the branches. A
former congressional staffer is well-positioned to advise her agency on
what potential actions would invoke Congress’s ire and thus should be
avoided. Once again, Mills and Selin’s work on agency detailees to Congress offers insights. Mills and Selin describe how detailees can assist Congress in predicting how their home agency would interpret a new statute.172
Similarly, staffers-turned-commissioners can assist agencies in predicting
how Congress might respond to a potential new rule or enforcement action. Further, once an agency finds itself in hot water with lawmakers, staffers-turned-commissioners may be able to use their connections in and understanding of Congress to cool the temperature and thus avoid embarrassing public hearings.173
Third, due to their connections to Congress, staffers-turned-commissioners may be particularly well-situated to assist their agencies’ lawyers
and policy experts in providing drafting assistance to lawmakers. The prac-

[https://perma.cc/BD7U-X6VH] (urging Congress to amend the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008).
169.
See Sarbanes-Oxley at Four: Protecting Investors and Strengthening the Markets:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Christopher
Cox, Chairman, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/ts091906cc.htm [https://perma.cc/GU3Z-8R3N].
170.
See Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1602 (2018) (defining “lobbying
contact” as, inter alia, “communication . . . to a covered . . . official that is made on behalf of a
client with regard to the formulation, modification, or adoption of Federal legislation”).
171.
See Blanes i Vidal et al., supra note 166, at 3732 (finding that lobbyists who previously worked for a senator find their income drop by twenty-four percent on average when that
senator retires, which suggests that staffers-turned-lobbyists exploit their connections to their Hill
employer to benefit their clients); id. (noting that staffers-turned-lobbyists comprise the largest
category of former government officials working as lobbyists).
172.
See Mills & Selin, supra note 153, at 620.
173.
See id. at 628 (noting a negative correction between the number of detailees on a
congressional committee and committee oversight levels, and speculating that committees with a
high number of detailees are able to resolve issues with the agency through a less adversarial forum); cf . THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 134-35 (1960) (“Trust is often
achieved simply by the continuity of the relation between parties . . . .”).
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tice of agencies assisting Congress with legislative drafting is commonplace.174 To the extent that staffers-turned-commissioners have deeper
knowledge of the drafting process and stronger ties to current lawmakers
than do other commissioners, they are better positioned to assist with this
task—to the potential benefit of their agency.175
Fourth, the presence of former congressional staffers on the daises of
independent commissions may encourage future delegations from Congress. Preference divergence between a principal and agent discourages
the principal from delegating authority to that agent,176 as does the principal’s uncertainty regarding the agent’s preferences.177 In other words, even
when Congress believes that the commission’s preferences are aligned with
its own, Congress’s uncertainty regarding this belief leads to suboptimal
delegation.178 When the President nominates and the Senate confirms a
former Hill staffer to an independent commission, however, Congress may
be more confident in its knowledge of the staffer’s preferences based on
her longstanding professional relationships with members of Congress.
Accordingly, Congress may be more comfortable delegating authority to
that commission in the future.
3. Increasing Democracy Accountability
The rise of staffers-turned-commissioners also may mitigate the administrative state’s democratic deficit.179 The Senate could channel its newfound energy concerning appointments into pushing for ideologically
aligned Beltway lawyers or technocratic internal candidates at the commissions to fill these roles. By choosing instead to select former Hill staffers,
the Senate may strengthen—albeit imperfectly—independent agencies’
democratic accountability and responsiveness.180

174.
See Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1377,
1401-02 (2017).
175.
See id. at 1411-12 (raising the prospect of self-dealing where an agency is involved
in drafting a statute that the agency administers).
176.
See Jonathan Bendor, Amihai Glazer & Thomas Hammond, Theories of Delegation, 4 ANN. R EV. POL. SCI. 235, 243-44 (2001).
177.
See id. at 244 (“Suppose the boss can make an educated guess about subordinates’
ideal points but does not know them precisely . . . [T]his reduces the value of delegating, if the
boss is risk-averse.”).
178.
See id.
179.
See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy
in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 461, 480 (2003) (discussing the origins of the “majoritarian critique of agency decisionmaking”).
180.
To be clear, we are not suggesting that the Senate’s increased role in appointments
alone has a remedial effect on accountability. Any increase in that chamber’s role necessarily implies a reduction in the President’s power, and we take no position on whether democratic accountability is better served by strengthening one of these institutions over the other. Instead, we
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To be clear, we are not suggesting that any loyalty that staffersturned-commissioners feel to their congressional principal renders commissions completely democratically accountable. By way of example, let’s
return to Richard Roberts, the former staffer to Senator Richard Shelby
who was later appointed to the SEC. To claim that Roberts’s appointment
makes the SEC more democratically accountable in this manner requires
the following herculean assumptions: (1) the public has views on securities
law; (2) the median senator reflects the public’s views; (3) Senator Shelby
reflects the median senator’s views; and (4) Roberts reflects Senator
Shelby’s views. All of these assumptions are open to challenge.181 To the
extent that commissioners are democratically responsive at all, that is
mostly because they are nominated by an elected President and confirmed
by an elected Senate.
Nonetheless, we wonder whether staffers-turned-commissioners’ experience in Congress makes them more attuned to—or even more solicitous of—the average citizen’s views than a Washington lawyer-turnedcommissioner would be. Lawmakers spend much of their time interacting
with constituents and evaluating how their actions will be perceived in
their district.182 High-level staffers, in turn, engage in deep and sustained
interactions with these lawmakers.183 Lawmakers’ attention to constituent
or mass public views might therefore rub off on staffers.
Recall, for instance, that Roberts previously served as Senator
Shelby’s chief of staff, both when Shelby was a first-term House member
and later when he became a senator.184 Serving as a high-level staffer to a
rising politician presumably provided Roberts with exposure to a lawmaker’s re-election imperative—and thus to constituent opinion. The
same cannot be said for an SEC lifer, a white-shoe lawyer, or any number
of other professions from which commissioners are selected.
We do not wish to hang too much on this hook. After all, the inevitable time lag between service as a Hill staffer and service as a commissioner
focus on the ways in which the Senate chooses to use its role in appointments—namely by appointing former employees to independent commissions—and how that enhances commissions’
democratic responsiveness.
181.
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Unitary Executive Interpretation: A Comment, 15
CARDOZO L. REV . 313, 318-19 (1993) (positing that congressional committee chairs tend to be
“farther from the median of national opinion than are presidents”).
182.
See ROGER H. DAVIDSON ET AL., CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 113 (14th ed.
2013).
183.
For instance, a large majority of legislative counsel responding to a survey claimed
that whether legislative history was drafted by a staffer versus a lawmaker is irrelevant because,
in the words of one respondent, “[e]verything staff does members approve, and everything members say is written by staff.” Abbe Gluck & Lisa Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part I , 65 STAN.
L. REV. 901, 983 (2013).
184.
See Thomas, supra note 5, at 1-2.
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means that any osmosis of public views that occurred while a staffer is no
longer current. Still, the possibility that staffers-turned-commissioners insert an added dose of democratic accountability to independent commissions is worth raising.

B. Intra-Agency
1. Playing Political Hardball
Staffers-turned-commissioners also may bring with them deep
knowledge of “political hardball”—that is, practices that are within the
bounds of the law, but are in tension with previously longstanding norms
of behavior—acquired through their prior employment in Congress.185
Congressional leaders often are viewed as savvy tacticians, able to see several moves ahead and use—or, better yet, bend—the rules of the game to
their advantage.186 If staffers-turned-commissioners learn at the knee of
these lawmakers, then we might expect them to import several strategies
to independent commissions. The following three areas are illustrative.
First, experience on Capitol Hill may provide staffers-turned-commissions with greater knowledge of how to advance favored changes and
delay disfavored ones. Staffers-turned-commissioners’ exposure to the legislative process gives them a front-row seat for the stagecraft involved in
introducing a proposed new policy, strategic considerations inherent in coalition-building, and the use of cheap talk and leverage in negotiations.
These skills presumably are applicable to policymaking in other multimember settings, such as independent commissions.
Similarly, they may have learned from their time on the Hill tactics to
delay disfavored policies. Commissioners generally have some ability to
delay rulemakings, and one might expect a former Hill staffer to be more
strategic in the use of this tactic.187 One former commissioner we spoke

185.

We adopt this definition from Mark Tushnet’s definition of constitutional hardball.

See Mark V. Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 523 (2004); see also
William Galston, Toughness as a Political Virtue, 17 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 175, 190 (1991)
(providing an early definition of the term political hardball: “hardball means sliding into the second baseman to break up a double play; softball means sliding around [him] . . . to avoid potentially injuring him; dirtyball means sliding into him spikes up with the intention of knocking him
out of the game.”).
186.
See, e.g., Amber Phillips, Another Big Mitch McConnell Supreme Court Gamble
Looks Set To Pay Off, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2008, 1:27 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/04/another-big-mitch-mcconnell-supreme-court-gamble-looks-set-pay-off/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8fa68f3561fc [https://perma.cc/D8XW-M8V4].
187.
See Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Advising, Consenting, Delaying, and Expediting:
Senator Influences on Presidential Appointments , 30 STUD. A M. POL. DEV. 19, 22 (2016) (explaining senators’ strategic use of “blue slip objection[s] . . . to delay, not defeat, a [judicial] nomination”).
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with noted, “a commissioner can easily push hearings off a week or two,
and given travel schedules and other priorities, sometimes a few-week delay could force a months-long delay in consideration of a rule.”188
Second, staffers-turned-commissioners—accustomed to switches in
partisan control that have occurred periodically in both chambers of Congress for the past twenty-five years—may be particularly adept at managing political transitions. Minority commissioners know “where the bodies
are buried,” according to another former commissioner we interviewed,
which enables policy reversals following a switch in partisan control of the
White House to happen more effectively.189 Their presence enables agencies to “unravel the bad policy more quickly, if the [new] majority is interested in doing so.”190 If Hill staffers are more ideologically committed and
politically savvy, their presence would increase the whipsaw nature of
agency regulation.
Third, practitioners of Hill-style political hardball may be more adept
at strategic obfuscation—that is, diverting attention concerning unpopular
decisions—than are appointees without experience in politics. For instance, strategic sub-delegations to civil servants may play a blame-avoidance function. Relatedly, a savvy commissioner can encourage the use of
guidance documents—which often alter regulated entities’ behavior and
thus can be considered a form of “soft law”191—in areas in which a formal
rule could trigger judicial review or political blowback. Finally, politically
sophisticated commissioners seeking to reduce their agency’s involvement
in a given area may push to reduce enforcement actions, which may attract
less attention than would acting through rulemaking or adjudication.192
2. Degrading Agency Culture
Recent years have witnessed not just the swelling ranks of former Hill
staffers on independent commissions and boards, but also marked changes
in the culture of several important independent agencies, with overtly partisan behavior encroaching on longstanding norms.193 In this Section, we

188.

E-mail from former commissioner of an independent agency to authors (Dec. 1,

189.

E-mail from former commissioner of an independent agency to authors (Dec. 4,

2018).
2018).
190.
Id.
191.
See Jacob Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice,
61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 576 (2008).
192.
See Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors, 119 COLUM. L. R EV. 369, 418 (2018).
193.
The SEC is illustrative. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Independent Agencies, Sometimes
in Name Only, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/09/business/independent-agencies-sometimes-in-name-only.html [https://perma.cc/3DZ5-B2FP] (“The S.E.C. has
in recent years splintered into factions far more than ever before . . . Now, [in contrast to the recent
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describe the sharp-elbowed approach to politics that has defined Congress
in recent decades. A similar style is beginning to manifest itself in several
agencies, which we suggest the migration of Hill staffers to agencies has
encouraged.
We are cautious in making this causal claim. For one, many venues
have become politicized in recent decades,194 making it difficult to isolate
the independent effects of Congress’s culture on changes in agency culture—let alone to label Congress as a “patient zero” for this phenomenon.
In addition, the evidence that one could marshal in support of or in opposition to this claim is necessarily impressionistic, further tempering our
conclusions. Nonetheless, there is a real and important dynamic at play:
congressional staffers-turned-commissioners have imported aspects of
Congress’s hard-edged culture to their agencies, and this development
merits further study.
a. Congress’s Culture
Four key themes characterize Congress’s organizational culture195: it
is partisan; it values bellicosity; it tolerates dysfunction; and it rewards loyalty.196 Before describing how congressional staffers-turned-commissioners have imported these interrelated features into agencies, we provide a
brief overview of the four features.

past,] there is some evidence that the [P]resident generally gets to choose the chairmen of independent commissions, but the other majority members are picked on Capitol Hill. The result has
been that chairmen of commissions can find it difficult to accomplish anything.”); Labaton, supra
note 17 (“The once-proud agency was so dysfunctional that it had no way of distinguishing the
meritless from the significant among the more than 700,000 whistle-blower and investor complaints it receives each year.”).
194.
See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 242-44 (2013) (increased polarization on the
Supreme Court); Markus Prior, Media and Political Polarization, 16 ANN. R EV. POL . SCI. 101
(2013) (among media outlets); Boris Shor & Nolan McCarty, The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 530 (2011) (in most state legislatures).
195.
We adopt the term “organizational culture” from management and business scholarship, where it refers to “a complex set of values, beliefs, assumptions, and symbols that define
the way in which a firm conducts its business.” Jay B. Barney, Organizational Culture: Can It Be
a Source of Sustained Competitive Advantage? 11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 656, 657 (1986). Shared
organizational culture fosters communication within the organization. See Alan Morrison & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., Culture, Competence, and the Corporation 2 (Oct. 2004) (unpublished manuscript),
https://gates.comm.virginia.edu/wjw9a/Papers/culturecompetence2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9DRA-29UA].
196.
For brevity, we consider Congress as a monolith in discussing its culture. In so doing,
we gloss over cultural differences between the House and Senate. See Tara Leigh Grove & Neal
Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV . 571, 605
(2014) (noting that “the two chambers of Congress maintain distinct institutional cultures”). Cultural differences also abound at the committee level. See, e.g., Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The Appropriations Committee as a Political System, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 310 (1962) (describing local
norms on one committee); cf. Kenneth Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative
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First, Congress’s increasingly partisan atmosphere has been well documented. On more and more votes, an overwhelming majority of legislators sort by party.197 To illustrate this growing partisan divide, Figure 6 reports the median Democratic and Republican senator’s first-dimension
DW-NOMINATE ideal point estimate from 1963 to 2017.198 Legislators
placed near -1 are considered very liberal; those near +1 are very conservative.199 As the figure shows, Senate Republicans have marched steadily to
the right during this period, while Democrats have moved slightly to the
left.
Figure 6: Partisan Polarization in the Senate
0.5
0.4

Median Ideal Point

0.3
0.2
0.1
Republicans

0

Democrats

-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
1961
1965
1969
1973
1977
1981
1985
1989
1993
1997
2001
2005
2009
2013
2017

-0.4

Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 248-49 (1992) (distinguishing between the
preferences of individual legislators and Congress as a whole and arguing that it is fruitless to
attribute legislative intent to the product of legislators’ collective effort).
197.
See Frances Lee, How Party Polarization Affects Governance, 18 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 261, 263 (2015).
198.
DW-NOMINATE sorts legislators in a multi-dimensional space based on the similarity of their roll call voting records. Figure derived from Party Medians from DW-NOMINATE.
Jeffrey B. Lewis et al., Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database, VOTEVIEW,
https://voteview.com/data [https://perma.cc/XUX8-L7TB]; see KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD
ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF R OLL CALL VOTING 23-24
(2000).
199.
See Poole & Rosenthal, supra note 198.

226

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3338092

Congress’s Commissioners
A similar figure for the House evinces even greater divergence in voting behavior by party200 The developers of the DW-NOMINATE metric
conclude that “Congress is now more polarized than at any time since the
end of Reconstruction.”201
Second, Congress’s culture is adversarial.202 As longtime Senate
staffer Ira Shapiro observed, “senators work in an acrimonious political
culture that seems to offer little reward for substance and sees moderation
and compromise as weaknesses.”203 Indeed, legislators arguably are incented towards antagonism. According to Professor Frances Lee, parties
win congressional elections by highlighting differences with the other
party.204 Merely placing issues on Congress’s agenda that are popular with
one’s constituents is not sufficient; legislators who want to see their party
in the majority must push bills that “provoke . . . resistance” from the other
party.205 That may mean scheduling message votes, meaning votes on bills
and amendments that have no chance of passage but will compel one’s opponents to make politically difficult choices.206 More generally, because “a
party benefits from harming the opposing party’s image,” Lee writes, it
must “look[] for ways to make its opposition appear weak and incompetent, as well as ideologically extreme and out of touch with mainstream
public opinion.”207

200.
201.

Figure and data on file with the authors.
Christopher Hare, Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Polarization in Congress
Has Risen Sharply. Where Is It Going Next?, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Feb. 13, 2014, 9:15
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/02/13/polarization-in-congress-has-risen-sharply-where-is-it-going-next/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b1864de5ffe5
[https://perma.cc/5ART-8YU8].
202.
See Cynthia R. Farina, Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional Dysfunction?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1724 (2015) (describing a “toxic party culture” in Congress).
At first glance, adversary and polarization may seem like two sides of the same coin. But it is
possible to disagree without being disagreeable. Cf. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Memoriam: Justice
Antonin Scalia, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (2016) (reminiscing on the author’s friendship with Justice
Scalia).
203.
IRA SHAPIRO, BROKEN: CAN THE SENATE SAVE ITSELF AND THE COUNTRY? 248
(2018).
204.
FRANCES LEE, INSECURE MAJORITIES: CONGRESS AND THE PERPETUAL CAMPAIGN 2 (2016).
205.
Id. at 45.
206.
Id. at 142-43.
207.
Id. at 2; accord Farina, supra note 202 at 1727 (“[M]embers of both parties are motivated to engage in scorched-earth tactics intended not merely to stymie the other side, even on
noncontroversial issues, but also to brand the opposition as incompetent, corrupt, or evil.”).
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Third, Congress’s culture abides dysfunction.208 While one ought not
to equate legislative inaction with dysfunction,209 the signs point to Congress performing its lawmaking function poorly.210 Using the subjects of
Congress-focused New York Times editorials as a measure of the size of
the legislative agenda each year, Professor Sarah Binder charts the proportion of those agenda items on which Congress fails to act in that year.211
She finds a secular increase in the frequency of deadlock on these issues
between 1947 and 2012.212 Congress’s record is no better for once-ordinary
tasks, such as budgeting and appropriations.213 Although whether a given
action or lack thereof evidences “dysfunction” is ultimately a subjective
determination, most observers would agree that chronic budget brinksmanship leading to government shutdowns, an inability to marshal public
resources to assist Americans after debilitating hurricanes, and an unwillingness to act against a foreign country’s attempts to subvert U.S. elections
all point to a malfunctioning legislature.214
Rather than decry these developments and take corrective actions,
Congress arguably encourages these machinations—and sometimes may
even reward them.215 Congressional leaders devote a growing proportion
of scarce calendar time to superficial message votes, which leaves less time

208.
Some political observers employ the term “dysfunction” as an all-purpose epithet in
arguing that Congress is overly partisan or adversarial. See, e.g., James P. Pfiffner, Dysfunctional
Politics in the United States: Origins and Consequences, 60 PAPERS ON PARLIAMENT 17, 17
(2014) (noting that polarization and gridlock have caused American politics to become dysfunctional). We, however, use this term in a narrower sense. After all, a legislature could be completely
polarized into two warring factions and still perform its basic functions as a lawmaking body (as
long as one faction holds a majority and majoritarian procedures govern the consideration of
bills). Nevertheless, that does not describe the contemporary Congress.
209.
See Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065,
2075 (2013) (distinguishing between inaction due to a lack of sufficient public consensus and inaction due to legislative gridlock).
210.
See Binder, supra note 130, at 93.
211.
Id. at 91.
212.
Id. at 93.
213.
See Balkin, supra note 79, at 1193; Lee, supra note 197, at 270.
214.
See Jennifer Hochschild, What’s New? What’s Next? Threats to the American Constitutional Order, in C ONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? 100 (Mark A. Graber et al. eds.,
2018).
215.
For instance, Representatives Eric Cantor (R-VA), Kevin McCarthy (R-CA), and
Paul Ryan (R-WI) orchestrated a confrontation over a 2011 debt-ceiling vote that, if successful,
would have caused the government to default on its debt, see MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 75,
at 8-9, raising the cost of future government borrowing and possibly causing the U.S. economy
and global capital markets to tank. See Terry Belton et al., The Domino Effect of a U.S. Treasury
Technical Default, J.P. MORGAN (Apr. 19, 2011) https://valkayec.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/morgan.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RKZ-CKYZ]. After 2011, Representatives
McCarthy and Ryan rose higher in the House leadership ranks, and Representative Cantor suffered no internal sanction for his role. VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CRS REP. FOR C ONGRESS,
RL30567, PARTY LEADERS IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 1789-2019, at 6-7 (2019).
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for substantive issues.216 Leadership also has cut legislative support agencies and staff resources, shortened the legislative workweek, and pushed
rank-and-file members to spend less time in Washington, thereby reducing
Congress’s institutional capacity.217
Finally, Congress prizes loyalty from its staffers.218 That emphasis on
loyalty—”an essential, paramount norm of congressional staff work,” according to Professors Barbara Romzek and Jennifer Utter219—begins on
the day a staffer is hired. As Professors Robert Salisbury and Kenneth
Shepsle observe, since “staffers are hired by specific members and work
under their direction, they soon come to accept a norm structure that emphasizes loyalty, of a very personal and specific kind, to be given to that
member.”220 Accordingly, the central object of staffers’ loyalty is to the legislator for whom they work.221 Most staffers also report a sense of loyalty
to their chamber, and a smaller subset report a sense of loyalty to Congress
overall.222
That staffers serve as at-will employees further encourages deference
and loyalty to legislators.223 Staffers do not benefit from the employment
protections granted to most of the federal workforce.224 This lack of job
security enables lawmakers to hire loyalists and fire renegades and ensures
that current staffers will remain mindful of the importance of loyalty.225
Given the need for staffers to respond to every whim of their principals,
Senator John Glenn referred to Congress’s employment culture as “the
last plantation.”226
Staffers who are willing to accept these loyalty norms tend to advance
in the institution.227 A survey of congressional staffers found that legislators, including committee chairs, tend to delegate greater responsibility to

216.
See Lee, supra note 197, at 271.
217.
See Farina, supra note 202, at 1726.
218.
See Christine DeGregorio, Staff Utilization in the U.S. Congress, 238 POLITY 261,
262 n.3 (1995) (collecting citations of “[s]cholarly reports of the loyalty and deference staffers
show toward their legislative bosses”).
219.
Romzek & Utter, supra note 152, at 1265.
220.
Salisbury & Shepsle, supra note 101, at 394.
221.
See Romzek & Utter, supra note 152, at 1266.
222.
See id.
223.
See Barbara S. Romzek, Accountability of Congressional Staff, 10 J. OF PUB. ADMIN. RES. 413, 422 (2000).
224.
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 4303, 7513 (2018). While the Congressional Accountability Act
of 1995 applies some federal anti-discrimination and workplace safety laws to congressional employees, it does not interfere with legislators’ ability to hire and fire legislative staff at will. See
Romzek, supra note 223, at 422.
225.
See Romzek, supra note 223, at 422-23.
226.
Id.
227.
See DeGregorio, supra note 218, at 273-75.
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staffers who demonstrate loyalty.228 By contrast, staffers who are motivated by other goals, such as their own ideological or policy agenda, tend
not to last long on Capitol Hill.229
b. Exporting Culture
Congressional staffers may similarly absorb norms of behavior from
their institution—and carry these lessons with them later in their careers.
Congressional dysfunction, such as it is, gets absorbed into the ethical and
practical behavior of staffers, traveling with them when they leave the Hill
for other government work.
Organizational theorist Edgar Schein asserts that organizational culture is a “pattern of shared basic assumptions” that—importantly—is
“taught to new members [of the organization] as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relations to those problems” that the organization
and its members face.230 The notion that social connections influence behavior is familiar to social scientists.231 In the government context, Professors David Fontana and Aziz Huq posit that officials are situated in an
“epistemic community,” shaping the set of arguments and behaviors to
which they are exposed—and establishing reputational costs for officials
who deviate from their institution’s position.232 The result: a government
official’s peer group affects her ultimate decisions.233 For instance, Professors Michael Frakes and Melissa Wasserman find marked peer effects in
the rate at which patent examiners grant applications.234 Further, whether
an examiner was hired during a period in which the Patent Office exhibited
a “permissive granting culture” influenced that examiner’s grant rate
throughout her career.235
Several characteristics of congressional staffers render them particularly susceptible to internalizing Congress’s culture. First, staffers tend to

228.
See id.
229.
See Salisbury & Shepsle, supra note 101, at 394.
230.
EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP: A DYNAMIC
VIEW 9 (2d ed. 1992).
231.
See David A. Siegel, Social Networks and Collective Action, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI.
122, 122 (2009) (“Across social science, a wealth of empirical evidence illustrates the ways in which
social interactions can alter choice.”).
232.
Fontana & Huq, supra note 69, at 59-60.
233.
Id. at 37-39.
234.
Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Knowledge Spillovers and Learning in
the Workplace: Evidence from the U.S. Patent Office 5, (Duke Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 2018-11), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3099029
[https://perma.cc/D84B-GDH8].
235.
See Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Patent Office Cohorts, 65 DUKE
L.J. 1601, 1631-34 (2016).

230

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3338092

Congress’s Commissioners
join the institution when they are relatively young,236 at an age at which
psychologists have found that beliefs and values are malleable.237 Second,
they are situated in small, insular networks,238 which facilitate both the development of uniform cultural practices and the administration of sanctions for deviations from these norms.239 Third, working for Congress can
be all-encompassing, with long hours and little time for family or outside
pursuits that could expose staffers to countervailing influences.240 Finally,
the combination of low pay, long hours, and lack of job security241 may
discourage all but the most ideologically motivated individuals from working for Congress242—and this group may be more willing than the average
person to adapt to Congress’s culture.
We argue that staffers, after internalizing Congress’s norms of behavior, carry these norms with them to their subsequent employment. In the
private sector, managers’ early professional experiences earlier can influence their management styles decades later. For instance, CEOs with law
degrees are associated with better performance for firms with above-average litigation risk.243 In another article in the same field, one of us has provided evidence that family environments strongly influence CEO decision
making, with CEOs raised in poorer homes and those exposed to moderate
family trauma outperforming CEOs raised in wealthier homes and those

236.
See Hagedorn, supra note 100, at 82.
237.
See Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 469, 474
(2000); Brent W. Roberts, Ayshalom Caspi, & Terrie E. Moffitt, Work Experiences and Personality Development in Young Adulthood, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 582, 583 (2003).
238.
See Barbara S. Romzek & Jennifer A. Utter, Career Dynamics of Congressional
Legislative Staff: Preliminary Profile and Research Questions, 6 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY
415, 417 (“Congress is a relatively small-scale work setting where individuals develop networks,
working relationships, and opinions about staffers and members of Congress . . . . Legislative staffs
are relatively small working groups . . . Full committees, which range from twenty to over one
hundred members in either body, constitute small work units.”).
239.
See Harry C. Triandis, The Self and Social Behavior in Differing Cultural Contexts,
96 PSYCHOL. REV. 506, 513 (1989).
240.
See Hagedorn, supra note 100, at 84; Cong. Mgmt. Found. & Soc’y for Human Res.
Mgmt., Life in Congress: Job Satisfaction and Engagement of House and Senate Staff, CONG.
MGMT.
FOUND.
74
(2013),
http://www.congressfoundation.org/storage/documents/CMF_Pubs/life-in-congress-job-satisfaction-engagement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F6KPMLYK].
241.
See Working in Congress: The Staff Perspective, CONG. MGMT. FOUND. 1 (1995),
http://www.congressfoundation.org/storage/documents/CMF_Pubs/CMF-Working-in-Congress.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4A2-9GNN] (“Staff typically work exceedingly long, unpredictable
hours that leave little time for outside activities; receive lower pay than both private sector and
federal executive branch staff . . . and have virtually no job security.”).
242.
See Montgomery & Nyhan, supra note 101, at 5 (asserting that “working conditions
[in Congress] have become increasingly unattractive for staff, making staff positions less appealing
to those who lack strong partisan views”).
243.
See M. Todd Henderson et al., Lawyer CEOs 23-24 (Feb. 21, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2923136
[https://perma.cc/9JHW-84CB].
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who experienced no or severe trauma in their youth.244 In a related vein,
CEOs with military backgrounds are more effective managers during times
of crisis than are CEOs without military experience.245 Further, combat
veterans tend to make riskier, more highly leveraged capital structure
choices as CEOs.246
Naturally, these early-stage experiences may affect an individual’s internalization of norms of behavior. For instance, the aforementioned findings concerning CEOs’ background suggest that lawyers-turned-CEOs absorb cautious, legalistic norms, whereas veterans-turned-CEOs are inculcated in a culture that values steadiness under pressure. Earlier professional experiences also may foster the development of a particularized set
of skills. While it is difficult to disentangle the specific mix of cultural
norms, skills, and other aspects of a previous experience that contribute to
CEO behavior, presumably culture is part of the mix.
In the context of government, federal employees who transition from
one branch of government to another bring with them the perspectives that
they socialized into during their service in their previous branch. Professor
Robert Robinson has found that Supreme Court Justices with prior executive-branch experience are more deferential to the executive branch.247
The extent to which they defer is positively correlated with the length of
their executive branch service, suggesting that executive-branch socialization—and not the Justices’ preexisting attitudes—is driving this result.248
Similarly, Professors Fontana and Huq posit that an Office of Legal Counsel attorney with even just a few months of prior work for the Senate Judiciary Committee will bring “a different sense of presidential power than
the OLC lawyer who never left the executive branch.”249
The experience of Republican senators who previously served in the
House contemporaneously with former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich offers another clue regarding the impact of institutional culture on
subsequent behavior in another institution. Professor Sean Theriault
charts these individuals’ Senate tenures, concluding that they “almost single-handedly at first, propelled party polarization and escalated partisan

244.
M. Todd Henderson & Irena Hutton, CEO Traits and Firm Outcomes: Do Early
Childhood Experiences Matter? 24 (Jan. 8, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3374389 [https://perma.cc/U3RU-5GR9].
245.
See Effi Benmelech & Carola Frydman, Military CEOs, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 43, 44
(2015).
246.
See Ulrike Malmendier et al., Overconfidence and Early-Life Experiences: The Effect of Managerial Traits on Corporate Financial Policies, 66 J. FIN. 1687, 1690 (2011).
247.
Robert R. Robinson, Executive Branch Socialization and Deference on the U.S.
Supreme Court, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 889, 891 (2012).
248.
Id.
249.
Fontana & Huq, supra note 69, at 71.
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warfare in the Senate.”250 Not only did these so-called “Gingrich senators”
amass a more extreme voting record than other Republicans,251 they also
displayed a more aggressive, slash-and-burn posture.252 As Senator Alan
Simpson (R-WY), who did not have a background in the Gingrich-era
House, observed: “The rancor, the dissension, the disgusting harsh level
came from those House members who came to the Senate. They brought
it with ‘em. That’s where it began.”253 Governor-turned-Senator George
Voinovich (R-OH) also drew a distinction between these former House
members—of whom he thought there were “too many” in the Senate—
and “other people.”254 In response, senators in the “other people” category
created an informal caucus as a counterweight to the aggressive, partisan
strategies that former House members pushed.255
What accounts for the cultural divide between Gingrich-era House
members and other senators? Differences in their constituencies explain
only about one-quarter of the variation in the two groups of senators’ voting behavior.256 Their personal characteristics—including age, religion, occupation, and other affiliations—offer little or no explanatory power.257 Instead, Theriault’s empirical analysis demonstrates that their service in the
House during Speaker Gingrich’s rise in the 1980s explains much of their
behavior.258
These senators picked up several lessons in the Gingrich-era House.
During this period, Gingrich and his lieutenants pushed the House Republican Conference towards a more aggressive posture, eschewing cooperation with the Democratic majority to influence legislation in favor of drawing clear contrasts with them.259 In drawing these contrasts, Gingrich and
his allies favored short floor speeches which, according to Lee, “used harsh
rhetoric and relentlessly charged majority Democrats with corruption, arrogance, and mismanagement.”260 Gingrich himself saw his objective as
changing the nation’s political culture, declaring that, whereas previous
Democratic speakers “had been essentially legislative leaders . . . I, on the

250.
SEAN M. THERIAULT, THE GINGRICH SENATORS: THE R OOTS OF PARTISAN WARFARE IN CONGRESS 16 (2013).
251.
Id. at 40-43.
252.
Id. at 35.
253.
Id.
254.
Id.
255.
Id.
256.
Id. at 17.
257.
Id. at 72.
258.
Id. at 17.
259.
See Steven V. Roberts, One Conservative Faults Two Parties, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11,
1983, at A18 (reporting that, “to Gingrich and his compatriots,” the notion of “tak[ing] on the
responsibilities of actually running the government . . . is heresy”).
260.
LEE, supra note 204, at 95.
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other hand, was essentially . . . seeking to do nothing less than reshape the
federal government along with the political culture of the nation.”261 Representatives-turned-senators adopted the House’s culture, internalized it,
and exported it to the Senate.
We argue that an analogous dynamic to the one Theriault identifies—
that one chamber’s culture can be exported to the other chamber—is at
play concerning congressional staffers-turned-commissioners. Having described how organizational culture can be inculcated, we turn to examining
how norms of behavior in several key independent agencies have grown
closer to congressional norms, just as these agencies have experienced an
influx of new commissioners from the Hill.
c. Absorption of Hill Culture?
Assessing the ways in which congressional staffers-turned-commissioners have altered their agencies’ cultures requires, first, describing the
extent to which agencies’ cultures have changed in recent years and, second, evaluating the extent to which these changes are attributable to an
influx of former congressional staffers. Challenges abound at both steps.
Culture does not lend itself to quantifiable metrics. Neither are there obvious tests for cultural change. Given these hurdles, our discussion is necessarily impressionistic—and our conclusions are merely suggestive.
We begin by clarifying what we are not arguing. We do not assign
complete responsibility for the increasingly polarized voting behavior
within some multimember agencies directly to staffers-turned-commissioners.262 To measure the ideological outlooks of staffers-turned-commissioners versus other commissioners, we employ Professor Adam Bonica’s
Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME), which
considers individuals’ history of political contributions as revealed preferences of their political ideologies.263 We identify the absolute values of the
ideological scores for members of ten agencies from 2000 to 2018, which is
261.
NEWT GINGRICH, LESSONS LEARNED THE HARD WAY: A PERSONAL REPORT 37
(1998).
262.
See, e.g., Lee, supra note 197, at (noting polarization on the NLRB and FEC); Roberta Karmel, Threats to the SEC’s Independence, AM. BAR ASS’N (Dec. 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2016/12/09_karmel/
[https://perma.cc/8VDC4XRU] (on the SEC).
263.
Adam Bonica, Codebook for the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and
Elections (DIME) (Version 2.0), HARV. DATAVERSE (Aug. 16, 2016), http://dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=2865308&version=2.2 [https://perma.cc/Q37V-DZVP]. Viewing decisions to donate to candidates as expressions of donors’ revealed preferences, DIME uses information concerning the dollar amount of each included donation and its recipient to estimate each
donor’s ideology. See Adam Bonica, Mapping the Ideological Marketplace, 58 AM. J. POL . SCI.
367, 367 (2014). These scores are centered at zero with a standard deviation of one; positive (negative) values indicate a conservative (liberal) outlook. Id. at 369.
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the period when former Hill staffers reached a critical mass at agencies.264
The mean value is 0.996 for former Hill staffers and 0.909 for other commissioners during this period. Although these values suggest that the ideological views of former congressional staffers may be slightly more extreme than other commissioners, the difference in means is trivial and, importantly, does not approach conventionally accepted levels of statistical
significance.265 Essentially, staffers-turned-commissioners likely are indistinguishable from other commissioners in terms of ideological extremism,
at least based on observable metrics.
The finding that staffers-turned commissioners are just as ideologically extreme as other commissioners is unsurprising. Congress, multimember agencies, and the political class from which members of both Congress and agencies often are drawn have all become increasingly polarized
in recent decades.266 That partisan polarization is multicausal and is occurring across multiple institutions simultaneously makes it difficult to tease
out the independent effects, if any, of congressional polarization on agency
polarization.267
Instead, our claim is that the presence of staffers-turned-commissioners changed the culture of independent agencies. Specifically, the increased prevalence of commissioners from Capitol Hill may have an independent effect on the functioning of these agencies, apart from the effect
of increased polarization in politics writ large. That claim—like most
claims regarding the influence of culture on decision-makers—eludes definitive tests.268 Yet clues exist.
Consider the SEC. In 2002, reporters on that agency’s beat took notice of its dysfunctional climate. According to the New York Times, the
SEC’s decision process that year for selecting a chair for the nascent Public
264.
The ten agencies are: the CPSC, FCC, FEC, FERC, FTC, EEOC, NLRB, NRC,
NTSB, and SEC.
265.
Welch’s two-sample t-test produces t = 0.917 and p-value = 0.361.
266.
See Feinstein & Hemel, supra note 39, at 26 (polarization on multimember agencies
with partisan-balance requirements); Morris P. Fiorina, Samuel A. Abrams & Jeremy C. Pope,
Polarization in the American Public: Misconceptions and Misreadings, 70 J. POL. 556, 557-58
(2008) (polarization among political elites); Christopher Hare & Keith T. Poole, The Polarization
of Contemporary American Politics, 46 POLITY 411, 415 (2014) (polarization in Congress)
267.
See Feinstein & Hemel, supra note 39, at 26-27 (discussing potential causes of polarization); supra note 264 (citing research on polarization in other institutions).
268.
Consider, for instance, Chief Justice John Roberts’s vote to uphold the Affordable
Care Act. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2016). That vote is in tension
with Chief Justice Roberts’s reputation as a generally conservative jurist, and is typically explained
as an act of institutional loyalty to the Supreme Court. See Fontana & Huq, supra note 69, at 63.
Chief Justice Roberts and other justices, according to theories on culture and institutional loyalty,
are embedded in a social network comprised of legal journalists, appellate practitioners, and academics, and this network influences justices towards institution-affirming behavior. Id. Professors
Fontana and Huq are adherents of this theory, yet they acknowledge that “it is not possible to say
with certainty what motivated Roberts.” Id.
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Company Accounting Oversight Board “dissolved into partisan bickering,” leaving the position vacant and resulting in “squabbling and lack of
cooperation spilling over to other commission matters.”269 These developments “threatened to undermine the credibility of both the [C]ommission
and the new accounting board.”270 The handling of that selection process
led to the resignation of SEC Chair Harvey Pitt, who remarked that “[i]n
a partisan environment, criticism often devolves into attack,” which is
“counterproductive.”271
News accounts indicate that the SEC’s pathologies have persisted
since then. In 2013, the New York Times reported that the SEC “has in
recent years splintered into factions far more than ever before.”272 That
article laid the blame squarely on staffers-turned-commissioners, noting
that the two newest commissioners were former Hill staffers and quoting
former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt’s observation that these commissioners
“tend to embrace the philosophy of their mentors.”273
Off-the-record conversations with senior officials at the SEC conducted as part of our research support this claim. The consensus view is
that the SEC’s culture has changed appreciably in the past few decades
because of the rise of the former staffer as commissioner. As one SEC official described, “There are things that we could be doing today—easy wins
on policies that reasonable people on both sides would agree to—but we
aren’t doing them because commissioners are not here to compromise but
are just doing the bidding of their congressional masters.”274 Another senior official put it this way: “In the past, academics or lawyers were commissioners, and they were used to bargaining and seeing the nuances of both
sides. This made deal making possible. Today, things have gotten way too
political around here. It is sad to see the lost opportunities.”275 The view is

269.
Floyd Norris, Help Wanted at the S.E .C., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2002),
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/13/business/help-wanted-at-the-sec-help-needed-for-reforms.html [https://perma.cc/4TJB-C2ZK]; see also David S. Hilzenrath, SEC Likely to Split on
Accounting Panel Chief, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2002), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2002/10/25/sec-likely-to-split-on-accounting-panel-chief/1215236e-957c-4d179d01-951d87ef07fa/?utm_term=.1c4be5525707 [https://perma.cc/8BH5-UBLS].
270.
Stephen Labaton, Ex-F.B .I. Chief Seen as Choice for Accounting Post, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 25, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/25/business/ex-fbi-chief-seen-as-choice-for-accounting-post.html [https://perma.cc/W2BM-8PAE].
271.
Patrick McGeehan, Defiant S.E .C. Chief Exhorts Wall Street and Assails Critics,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/09/business/defiant-sec-chief-exhorts-wall-street-and-assails-critics.html [https://perma.cc/L3VW-DXTW].
272.
Floyd Norris, Independent Agencies, Sometimes in Name Only, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
8, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/09/business/independent-agencies-sometimes-inname-only.html [https://perma.cc/R8S6-Z678].
273.
Id.
274.
Interview with SEC official (Mar. 27, 2018).
275.
Id.
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shared by officials within the professional ranks of the SEC as well: “Yeah,
I’ve seen a change in how things happen [on the policy making floor]. I’d
say the pipeline from Capitol Hill has really changed this place for the
worse.”276
Or consider the NRC. In June 2011, an inspector general report
charged that NRC Chair Gregory Jaczko engaged in hardball tactics with
his fellow commissioners—for instance, failing to inform them of budgetary changes—in an effort to conceal his endeavors to cease work on the
Yucca Mountain, Nevada, nuclear storage facility.277 One month later,
journalists reported that a partisan cleavage developed at the Commission
concerning measures to reduce meltdown risks at nuclear reactors.278 By
the fall, other commissioners sent a letter to the White House expressing
“grave concerns” with Jaczko’s leadership.279 The letter averred that
Jaczko “intimidated and bullied senior career staff to the degree that he
has created a high level of fear and anxiety resulting in a chilled work environment.”280
And what was Jaczko’s background? In brief, he was a congressional
staffer to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV), who opposed nuclear waste storage in Nevada.281 Given Jaczko’s biography, his aggressive
pursuit of the objectives of his political patron is unsurprising. President
Obama reportedly appointed Jaczko to the NRC at Senator Reid’s urging.282
In addition to this anecdotal evidence of a more dysfunctional decision-making process at several commissions, a growing partisan split on

276.
277.

Telephone interview with SEC official (Dec. 12, 2018).
See John M. Broder & Matthew L. Wald, Report Blasts Management Style of Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/11/science/earth/11nuclear.html?scp=1&amp;sq=jaczko%20inspector%20general&amp;st=cse [https://perma.cc/835C-KFUZ].
278.
See Matthew L. Wald, Split Within Nuclear Regulatory Agency, N.Y. TIMES (July
20,
2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/science/earth/21nuke.html
[https://perma.cc/YE53-BBA7].
279.
Letter from Kristine L. Svinicki, Comm’r, Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, et al., to
William L. Daley, Chief of Staff, White House (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/272333-daley-letter.html [https://perma.cc/4FLU-GF9L].
280.
Id.
281.
See Broder & Wald, supra note 277. Jaczko started his career as a congressional
science fellow for then-Representative Ed Markey (D-MA), then moved to a post as appropriations director and science advisor to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV). NRC, Gregory
B. Jaczko, Chairman, U.S. N UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, https://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/organization/commission/former-commissioners/jaczko.html [https://perma.cc/3NRE-C47Y].
282.
See Broder & Wald, supra note 277.
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votes in several commissions also suggests that commissions may be following Congress’s lead regarding partisan polarization.283 Journalists describe partisan divisions on both high-profile commissions like the FCC
(“bitter and partisan”)284 and on lesser known ones like the CPSC (“deepening a partisan rift”).285 Indeed, the proportion of FCC decisions that
were strictly on party lines has been creeping upwards since the 1990s.286
Importantly, partisan votes may not fully capture the extent to which
partisan fissures exist on commissions and boards. Voting records for the
FCC, for instance, do not reflect that commission’s adversarial culture, in
part because the FCC Chair can utilize his powers over personnel and
budgeting to, as Professor Daniel Ho described, “dominate[] and bull[y]
other commissioners into compliance.”287
Finally, even when commissioners agree with an outcome, they are
increasingly willing to write separately rather than sign onto their colleagues’ opinions. Again, the FCC provides an example; the proportion of
FCC cases with a concurrence increased from a low of approximately five
percent in the mid-1980s to almost forty percent in the mid-2000s.288 And
when FCC commissioners decide not only to vote against the majority but
also to issue a dissenting opinion critiquing the majority’s reasoning, those
dissents tend to take an aggressive tone.289

283.
See Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 COLUM. L. R EV.
1739, 1762 & n.112 (2015) (collecting citations regarding partisan splits on independent commissions).
284.
Stephen Labaton, F.C .C. Faces a New Set of Challenges After Powell, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 24, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/24/business/media/fcc-faces-a-new-set-of-challenges-after-powell.html [https://perma.cc/PN9J-L5MD].
285.
Andrew Martin, After Long Battle, Safer Cribs , N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/business/with-new-safety-rules-for-cribs-makers-scrambleand-retailers-fume.html [https://perma.cc/8WXG-Z5CX].
286.
See Keith S. Brown & Adam Candeub, Independent Agencies and the Unitary Executive Debate: An Empirical Critique, Mich. St. U. Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 06-04 (Mar. 4,
2008), available online at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1100125 (last accessed Nov. 1, 2020), at *5. Likewise, while non-unanimous decisions on the FERC are relatively
rare, recent years have seen an increase in the number of 3-2 decisions where the split is on party
lines. Email from Sharon Jacobs, Associate Professor of Law, Univ. of Colo. Sch. of Law to Brian
Feinstein (Aug. 24, 2018) (on file with the authors). The bottom line is that there is great variability
in the extent to which these agencies are polarized. See Sharon Jacobs, Administrative Dissents,
59 WM. & MARY L. REV., 541, 570-71 (2017); see also id. at 561, 567-68 (reporting that consensus
norms continue to govern NRC rulemaking decisions).
287.
Daniel E. Ho, Measuring Agency Preferences: Experts, Voting, and the Power of
Chairs, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 333, 360 (2010).
288.
See Ho, supra note 41, at 14.
289.
See Jacobs, supra note 286, at 563.
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Once again, examining observable behavior—namely, the frequency
with which commissioners write separately—may underestimate the phenomenon.290 For one, because the chair sets the agenda at many agencies,291
a strategic chair may block agency consideration of issues on which the
chair is in the minority.292 In this situation, a commission’s dissent rate
would underestimate the degree to which the commission is fractured, because those issues on which the chair is on the losing side of a divided commission would not come up for a vote. Further, differences in norms regarding the utility of pre-vote bargaining—which may have nothing to do
with number of former Hill staffers in the agency—also stymie crossagency comparisons of dissent rates.293
3. Improving Rulemaking Capacity
Hill staffers may import not only Congress’s culture, but also
knowledge of the legislative intent and substance of the statutes that their
agencies administer. This expertise—which is certainly different, and in
some ways deeper, than the statutory expertise that a private-sector regulatory lawyer would bring—may benefit their agencies in two respects.
First, staffers-turned-commissioners who were involved in drafting a
statute that their agency administers may be better equipped to exercise
delegated authority. For instance, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act delegated policymaking authority to federal agencies concerning fifty-seven discrete policy areas.294 The SEC promulgated forty-six rules pursuant to these delegations, including nine rules during the tenure of legislator-turned-SEC
chair Christopher Cox.295 Given Cox’s prior involvement in drafting the
Act—as a member of Congress, he served on the House Financial Services
Committee and on the House-Senate conference committee on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act296—Cox presumably was intimately familiar with the
290.
See id. at 572-73 (noting that while NRC commissioners rarely release separate
statements, “allegations of Commission partisanship have been rampant in recent years”).
291.
See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice, The Theory and
Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 A DMIN. L. R EV. 1111, 1174, 1177-78 (2000).
292.
See Ho, supra note 287, at 337-38.
293.
Id. at 354; accord Breger & Edles, supra note 291, at 1246-47 (noting that the EEOC
does not permit its commissioners to issue separate opinions).
294.
See Pamela J. Clouser McCann, Replication Data File for The Strategic Use of Congressional Intergovernmental Delegation, HARV. DATAVERSE (2015), https://dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/29108/HXYBPG&version=1.0
[https://perma.cc/BKG6-YW8K] (data file used to calcite this figure).
295.
Figures calculated using ProQuest Regulatory Insight Database. Regulatory Insight, PROQUEST, https://regulatoryinsight.proquest.com/regulatoryinsight/search/basicsearch
[https://perma.cc/AR4Y-F6DX].
296.
See Sarbanes-Oxley at Four: Protecting Investors and Strengthening the Markets:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin.: 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman,
U.S.
Securities
&
Exchange
Commission),
https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/ts091906cc.htm [https://perma.cc/GU3Z-8R3N].
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scope of activities that the law authorized the SEC to undertake. Thus he
could hit the ground running at the SEC.
Second, to the extent that staffers-turned-commissioners have greater
knowledge of the legislative history of their agencies’ organic statutes
based on their time on Capitol Hill, they could use that expertise to construct rules that are more likely to withstand judicial review. We do not
presume that staffers-turned-commissioners have greater subject-matter
expertise in general and thus are better able to craft rules that survive arbitrary-and-capricious review. There is no reason to suspect, for instance,
that a telecommunications law firm partner-turned-FCC Commissioner, or
an FCC careerist-turned-FCC Commissioner, would be more or less
knowledgeable of telecommunications law than, for example, the chief
communications counsel of the House Energy & Commerce Committee
would be.
But we do think that the House counsel may possess greater expertise
in one key area: the bill-drafting process and grasping legislative intent.297
That greater expertise may benefit the agency when crafting regulations
that later provoke litigation challenging the agency’s interpretation of the
relevant statute.
Agencies pay careful attention to legislative history and strive to ensure that their regulations adhere to the statute’s purpose—or, at least, do
not stray far enough such that a court strikes down the regulations.298 This
attention is justified, because under the Chevron framework, a court reviewing a regulation first evaluates whether the governing statute is ambiguous and, if so, whether the agency’s interpretation of the ambiguous
statute is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.”299 Some
commentators observe that the D.C. Circuit has added an intermediate
step to Chevron: whether the agency recognized that the statute is ambiguous.300 Others whittle the doctrine down to one step: whether the agency’s
position is permitted as a matter of statutory interpretation.301

297.
SEC Chair Cox’s prior experience as a lawmaker during the drafting of SarbanesOxley again is illustrative. Cox “well remember[s] the significant work that preceded the drafting
of [Sarbanes-Oxley], including extensive hearings.” Id.
298.
See Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility
to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 C HI.-KENT L. R EV.
321, 329 (1990) (“Legislative history has a centrality and importance for agency lawyers that might
not readily be conceived by persons who are outside government and are accustomed to considering its relevance only to actual or prospective judicial resolution of discrete disputes.”); Walker,
supra note 174, at 1398-1400 (describing agencies’ use of legislative history in and purposivist approach to statutory interpretation).
299.
Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
300.
See Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, 84 U. CHI.
L. REV. 757, 757 (2017).
301.
See Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95
VA. L. REV. 597, 599 (2009).
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Under any of the views of Chevron, agencies that are skilled at statutory interpretation will come out ahead. If an agency correctly recognizes
that a statutory provision is ambiguous and demonstrates an awareness of
the range of permissible constructions, we should expect that agency to
enjoy greater success in statutory interpretation cases than a less adept
agency would. Accordingly, staffers-turned-commissioners who drafted
legislation while working in Congress presumably will be more successful
rule-writers at independent agencies.
IV. Implications
The previous section of this Article argued that the placement of former Hill staffers onto commissions provides Congress with an important—
albeit indirect and subtle—power over regulatory policy. In this section,
we draw out several implications of this assertion and offer suggestions regarding how each of the two political branches ought to respond to the
staffers-to-commissioners pipeline.

A. Enculturation as a Source of Congressional Power
The most fundamental implication of our analysis is that Congress
matters in more ways than one might think. Congress’s levers of influence
over administrative agencies extend beyond its conventional functions of
lawmaking, budget, and oversight.
That conclusion should be cause for at least partial reconsideration of
the conventional notion that Congress is a moribund body. Growing concerns that Congress is no longer a player in policymaking have generated
a slew of reform proposals.302 Recognizing the severity of this supposed
institutional lassitude, the House voted overwhelmingly in January 2019 to
establish a Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress to address,
inter alia, staff retention problems and bill-scheduling procedures that promote gridlock.303 These discussions understandably focus on how Congress’s perceived pathologies affect that institution.
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See, e.g., Michelle Cottle, Mike Lee’s New Crusade, ATLANTIC (Feb. 21, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/mike-lee-article-one-project/462564
[https://perma.cc/HA23-TJ9G]; Lee Drutman, To Fix Congress, Make It Bigger. Much Bigger,
WASH. MONTHLY (Nov./Dec. 2018), https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/november-december-2018/to-fix-congress-make-it-bigger-much-bigger
[https://perma.cc/J7YA-8MQS];
Thomas Spulak & George Crawford, How to Fix Congress in One Step, POLITICO (Sept. 19, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2018/09/19/house-rules-committee-congress-000699
[https://perma.cc/6KN3-DDJY].
303.
H. R. Res. 6, 116th Cong. § 201 (2019) (enacted); see also Final Vote Results for
Roll
Call
12,
U.S.
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES
(Jan.
4,
2019),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2019/roll012.xml [https://perma.cc/SNP4-B3MP] (reporting the floor
vote).
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But with the growing placement of former congressional personnel
into high-level positions in the administrative state, the legislative branch’s
operations and culture may influence the functioning of institutions far
from Capitol Hill in ways that members of Congress may not have anticipated. Like Johnny Appleseeds, staffers-turned-commissioners bring Congress’s ways with them into the administrative state.
If lawmakers desire to amplify their role in administration even further, it would behoove them to pay closer attention to the organizational
cultures of potential appointees’ past professional homes to a similar extent as lawmakers examine other aspects of their résumés. For instance, a
communications lawyer who has served as legislative counsel earlier in her
career may bring with her a different cultural outlook to the FCC than an
otherwise identical lawyer possessing the same credentials and political
views, but-for her lack of congressional experience. This difference, in
turn, could have consequences not only for the functioning of the FCC, but
also for Congress’s ability to indirectly influence that commission.
While the idea that early-career enculturation will affect individuals’
later behavior is not novel, dating back at least to Plato,304 this insight deserves greater attention from those seeking to alter the relative influence
of the political branches in administration.

B. White House Countermeasures?
Our last point is more controversial, but nonetheless follows directly
from the evidence and argument presented above. Under current law and
practice, independent commissions are, as their name implies, largely free
from ongoing, operational White House control. While the Supreme Court
has held that independent commissions are part of the executive branch,305
and presidents of both parties have feinted in the direction of executivebranch supervision,306 the President’s ability to control independent com-

304.
See PLATO, Laws XII, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 1495 (Edith
Hamilton & Huntington Caims, eds., 1969) (advising that foreign travel be restricted to those over
age forty because immersion in foreign cultures by younger people can cause social disorder at
home).
305.
See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
306.
See Exec. Order No. 13,579, § I, 3 C.F.R. §§ 256, 257 (2012) (encouraging independent agencies to engage in cost-benefit analysis); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1994)
(requiring independent agencies to prepare a Regulatory Plan and contribute to the Unified Regulatory Agenda); Bridget C.E. Dooling, OIRA Sends a Smoke Signal on Independent Agencies,
36 YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Aug. 23, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/oira-sends-asmoke-signal-on-independent-agencies [https://perma.cc/82W3-QZ6V] (interpreting language in
President Trump’s Executive Order 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017), as “sending signals”
regarding the Administration’s designs on independent agencies).
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missions is limited. For instance, these commissions are not generally subject to White House supervision by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB). Most significantly, unlike executive departments they are not required to assess the economic costs and benefits of important regulations
and submit their analyses to OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) for review.307
There are many in the academy, government, and the bar who believe
this degree of autonomy should be curtailed. Former OIRA Director and
current D.C. Circuit Judge Neomi Rao expanded OIRA review of Internal
Revenue Service regulations and “strongly hinted that independent regulatory agencies might be next.”308 Judge Rao argued that OIRA oversight
promoted better regulatory practices across “all agencies that regulate the
public.”309 President Obama also asked independent agencies to engage in
retrospective cost-benefit analysis of existing rules,310 thereby encouraging
them to adhere to similar principles as those that OIRA applies to executive agencies.311
The notion that independent agencies ought to be subject to some
form of White House review has the endorsement of the ABA’s Section of
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice. The Section’s 2016 report to
the President-elect of the United States “strongly urge[d] [the Presidentelect] to bring the independent regulatory commissions within the requirements for cost-benefit analysis, OMB review, and retrospective review of
rules currently reflected in Executive Order 12,866 and Executive Order
13,563.”312
Our Article strengthens the case for executive-branch oversight. The
rise of Hill staffers as commissioners undermines the claim that independent commissions are run by politically neutral technocrats. Indeed, these
commissioners are increasingly political actors and thus should be subject
to political controls. After all, in the strong form of our argument, Congress projects its power into commissions through the presence of staffersturned-commissioners. It follows straightforwardly that the White House
should be able to oversee this attempt to influence the administration of
law.
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See Will OIRA Extend its Review to Independent Agencies, FEDERALIST SOC’Y
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309.
Id.
310.
See Exec. Order No. 13,579, § I, 3 C.F.R. §§ 256, 257 (2012).
311.
See Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and
Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1839 n.3 (2013).
312.
See Am. Bar Ass’n, Section of Admin. Law and Regulatory Practice, Improve the
Administrative Process: A Report to the President-Elect of the United States, AM. BAR ASS’N
(2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/administrative_law/Final%20POTUS%20Report%2010-26-16.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ENW-FKN8].
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One potential White House response would be to emphasize a “presidential aide-to-commissioner” pathway that would crowd out the staffersturned-commissioners one. We counsel against that sort of tit-for-tat approach, based on the concern that it would do little beyond provoking another round of one-upmanship.
Instead, a President who endeavors to provide a counterweight to the
power that Congress projects thorough staffers-turned-commissioners
should consider subjecting independent agencies to cost-benefit analysis
through OIRA review. That approach facilitates presidential control over
agencies, delivering the highest-impact proposed rules from all corners of
the administrative state to the White House door.313 Further, OIRA review
arguably improves the quality of regulatory policy, encouraging economically efficient rules,314 checking cognitive biases facing agency personnel,315
and serving as a central node to facilitate information aggregation and interagency coordination.316
On the other side, OIRA’s critics decry its relative lack of expertise
in the substantive subjects that agencies address317 and claim that its judgments are often ad hoc and politicized,318 among other infirmities.319 Although we do not take a position on whether OIRA review is good for society on net, we do assert that it is undoubtedly an effective mechanism for
a President endeavoring to check Congress.320
Conclusion
This Article documents a sea change in the composition of independent regulatory commissions. Compared to a generation ago, commissioners
are now more than four times more likely to be former congressional staffers. This development is not a fluke. Rather, it represents a fundamental shift
in the allocation of power among the branches of government.
We have advanced a theory explaining this phenomenon, noting that
it occurred around the same time as Congress’s influence over policy via
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315.
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1059, 1072-73 (2000).
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See id. at 1868.
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See Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era of OIRA , 33 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1097, 1116 (2006).
318.
See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. R EV. 821, 832 (2003).
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See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE
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320.
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its other powers has eroded, and as the attractiveness of serving as a commissioner has increased for congressional staffers relative to other potential appointees. Placing loyal congressional aides onto independent commissions presents an alternative pathway through which legislators can influence public policy, which is increasingly delivered through the administrative state.
Our story is not merely that as the executive branch asserted its influence in one way, the legislative branch responded by trying to counter it in
another way, Instead, the Congress-to-commission pathway likely changes
the way in which the administrative state operates. To the extent that former staffers take the culture of, and their connections to, Capitol Hill with
them to their new jobs, then some of Congress’s pathologies may inhibit
agency functioning. On the other hand, linking commissions with the legislative branch may increase democratic accountability, provide meaningful
oversight, and improve commissions’ understanding of congressional objectives.
Although the net advantages and disadvantages of this development
for particular agencies or at particular times is uncertain, on balance, the
rise of Hill staffers as commissioners strengthens the case for greater executive branch control over these agencies. Our data lay bare the reality that
many of the heads of independent agencies are political actors, not neutral
technocrats, calling into question the primary impediment to subjecting
these agencies to executive branch oversight.
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